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Abstract
Globalisation and changes in financial systems across the world are causing marked
changes in processes of financial regulation and supervision and are also calling into
question the existing arrangements for protecting depositors and investors. This
paper examines the factors prompting the changes. It first presents theoretical
considerations governing supervision, regulation and protection. It continues by
presenting some history of depositor protection in the European Union in the
process overcoming a remarkable paucity of accessible information on the subject.
It continues by presenting as much history of depositor and investor protection in
the Netherlands as could be garnered from public and dnb sources. It describes
instances where the present arrangements might be changed. It concludes by noting
that debate in the Netherlands concerning reform is vigorous. It is hoped that this
paper will contribute to that debate and will help to build a consensus on the nature
of the reforms that are needed.
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Depositor and investor protection in The Netherlands: past, present and future6 Occasional Studies 2.21  Introduction
The purpose of this study is to assess the systems of depositor and investor protec-
tion in the Netherlands and to examine relevant issues for the future of these
schemes. 
A number of developing countries are currently introducing systems of deposit
insurance while others are making changes to the systems that they already have in
place. There are two reasons behind these changes. First, the systems are trying to
find an answer to the rapid changes in the financial environment, which include
trends of globalisation and conglomeration of the financial system and the blurring
of distinctions between financial products. The trend of globalisation requires a lev-
el playing field in order to promote financial efficiency and prevent regulatory arbi-
trage. In the European Union (eu) this is reflected in the harmonisation of financial
regulation, including deposit insurance, along the lines of the harmonised directives
on deposit-guarantee schemes (1994), investor compensation schemes (1994) and
investor protection schemes (1997). The trend of conglomeration and the blurring of
distinctions between financial institutions and products may result in a movement
toward integration of deposit, securities and insurance protection. Second, the
changes that are taking place and that are under consideration are to be seen as a
response to developments in the theoretical approach to financial regulation, such
as the increased awareness of the role of moral hazard and the importance of incen-
tive mechanisms in regulation in general. This awareness is also reflected in for exam-
ple the new Basle Capital Accord. The importance of the subject of deposit insur-
ance in Europe is reflected not only by eu directives on the matter, but also by the
establishment of a European Forum of Deposit Insurers. 
In 2002, the design of financial supervision in the Netherlands changed fundamen-
tally.  As a result, the investor compensation scheme (ics) was brought under the
oversight of the central bank, which has had responsibility for the system of deposit
insurance since it was established in 1978. This institutional change provides the
opportunity to reconsider the design of the protection schemes in the light of the
developments sketched above. 
This study is organized as follows. To put the discussion in a broader context, the
next chapter provides the theoretical background to depositor and investor protec-
tion. Chapter 3 provides some history of deposit insurance and investor protection
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directives and to the changes in the financial environment and what developments
are likely to occur in the near future. Chapter 4 assesses the systems of depositor and
investor protection in place in the Netherlands in early 2003 against the backdrop of
internationally accepted standards. 1 It concludes that, whereas in some areas the sys-
tems confirm to good practices, there are some areas where improvement is possi-
ble. Based on this assessment, chapter 5 examines relevant issues to facilitate the dis-
cussion of the future of protection for depositors, investors, pensioners and
insurance policyholders in the Netherlands. Chapter 6 summarizes the paper. 
The main conclusions of this study are the following. The Netherlands was among
the first European countries to introduce deposit insurance. Over time, all countries
have adapted their systems in the spirit of the eu-directives on the matter, although
it seems that some countries still need to undertake changes to comply with specif-
ic articles. In a number of aspects, the systems in the Netherlands conform to the
good practices advocated in the literature. The schemes operate under a good legal,
financial and political environment, have realistic objectives, are compulsory,
defined in law and regulation, and offer limited coverage. However, there are also
some divergences from good practice. There is no deposit insurance fund, premiums
are not risk-adjusted, there is no financial backing from the government, and the
arrangements for members to share costs are unclear. Further, the threat of closure
is not effective for large banks, the systems’ obligations to customers are not known
because there is no measure of insured funds, the repayment process and final set-
tlement are slow and all loans are offset. Finally, improvements could be made in
governance structures, accountability, and public relations. This study recommends
that the reorganized system(s) be (partly) funded ex ante to facilitate risk-adjusting
premiums and reduce member institutions’ uncertainty regarding funding arrange-
ments. The fund could be financed minimally to cover just anticipated needs and
administrative expenses for the current year or it could be made larger by including
capital to cover unexpected losses. There could also be provisions for additional ex
post assessments if needed and a formal government acceptance of responsibility for
losses incurred in a systemic crisis that is beyond the financial capacity of member
institutions. Charges for protection should be risk-based. If dnb reorganizes the
Comprehensive Guarantee Scheme (cgs) and the ics, it has three options, it could
(1) fully combine the two schemes, (2) combine them administratively, while keep-
ing their funding separate, or (3) reorganize them so that one scheme guarantees
deposit products offered by both banks and investment firms while a second scheme
would protect investment products offered both by banks and investment firms. dnb
should make arrangements to obtain data on the total value of either eligible or
insured deposits (and investments) on a regular basis. This is necessary because a
guarantee system needs to know its obligations in order to set premiums and a tar-
get for the fund. Compensation should be paid more rapidly. The provisions for
additional public information should be continued. A public relations campaign
8 Occasional Studies 2.2could be designed to inform the population about the schemes. A final challenge
ahead is the possibility of extending protection to the pension and insurance indus-
tries, depending on the outcome of eu deliberations on the matter.
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2.1.  Introduction
In order to put the discussion about depositor and investor protection in the Nether-
lands in a broader perspective, this chapter discusses the economic rationale for
financial regulation. It is structured as follows. The next section presents legitimate
objectives for financial regulation in general and for depositor and investor protec-
tion in particular. It also discusses the pitfalls of financial guarantees and the role of
the guarantor. Moreover, it touches upon regulation of the pensions and insurance
industry as possible expansions of financial protection. Section 2.3 contrasts the
objectives that theeusets for its systems of protection with the goals of deposit insur-
ance in the United States (us). Section 2.4.summarizes the factors that demand
reform of the existing systems of financial protection around the world. 
2.2  Legitimate objectives for financial regulation and protection
A stable financial system is a public good. Externalities give the public sector a role
to play in providing a financial safety net to ensure stability (Freixas and Rochet,
1997). Within the financial system banks are essential to the smooth functioning of
the economy because they usually operate the payment system, are the conduits for
monetary policy, intermediate between savers and borrowers, and have precious
confidential knowledge about their borrowers. Yet, banks are also vulnerable to indi-
vidual runs and contagious collapse, because of the unique composition of their
illiquid, opaque, longer-term assets, more liquid shorter-term liabilities, and their
interrelationships. Consequently, banks have been the principal beneficiaries of the
safety net consisting of a system of regulation and supervision, lending of last resort,
and deposit insurance. In the eu, this is reflected, inter alia, in harmonized directives
aimed at creating a level playing field and preventing regulatory arbitrage.
Investment firms have been regarded as less vulnerable to illiquidity and insolvency
because their assets and liabilities are less mismatched than those of banks. Conse-
quently, for many years they have not been seen as special or worthy of an extensive
safety net. Nevertheless, the eu has argued that there are systemic risks that could
arise from widespread failures of brokers and dealers that would prejudice the liq-
uidity of the securities markets. Moreover, it sees regulation in the securities markets
10 Occasional Studies 2.2as warranted because there are linkages between securities firms and other financial
firms so that the failure of one could lead to the demise of others. The resulting loss
of confidence in investor firms and financial markets could reduce financial inter-
mediation and harm economic efficiency and growth.2
The case for regulating banks 
Bank deposits can be withdrawn instantaneously without cost, making banks
exposed to both rational and irrational runs.3Therefore, even the condition of sound
banks can be prejudiced by a liquidity crisis. This provides a rationale for instituting
a safety net for banks.4Besides the damage they may do to the financial system, bank
runs may also affect monetary conditions. Runs can be of two kinds: runs to safe
havens and runs to cash and/or foreign currency. Where a fearful depositor moves
his funds from a weak bank to a safer bank, there will be merely a temporary dis-
ruption as balances are redistributed, possibly resulting in an eventual increase in the
efficiency. However, if the run results from a fall in confidence in the banking sec-
tor as a whole, the depositor most likely will run to cash and the money supply will
be diminished. If the monetary authority does not respond appropriately, a reces-
sion can ensue or be exacerbated. Where the depositor runs to foreign currency, the
exchange rate may depreciate and monetary conditions may be disrupted. Govern-
ments have instituted systems of lending of last resort and deposit insurance to coun-
teract bank runs. 
The pitfalls of guarantees
A well-constituted lender of last resort and the deposit insurer together can contain
many of the adverse macroeconomic consequences of an unsound banking system.
However, a poorly designed safety net can reduce market discipline, where it elimi-
nates incentives to monitor bank behavior. This is one of the reasons for offering
lending of last resort only to illiquid but solvent banks and for limited insurance cov-
erage, so that banks’ sophisticated creditors can continue to exercise market disci-
pline. The pitfalls to depositor and investor protection include adverse selection,
moral hazard and principal-agent problems. 
Adverse selection occurs if insurers are unable to distinguish good banks from bad
banks. In that case they may set prices to cover a middling amount of risk. If the
deposit insurance system is not compulsory, good banks will not enter the insurance
scheme because premiums are too high, given their risk profile. If the system is com-
pulsory, it may be that the profits the insurers obtain from the good banks are insuf-
ficient to cover the losses they incur from the risks taken by the bad banks. This is
the case if losses are asymmetrically distributed.
Moral hazard may arise because, once the guarantee is made, depositors will moni-
tor less, banks will increase the risks they undertake, supervisors may forbear, and
politicians may interfere. However, this pitfall will be counteracted, at least partial-
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a bank. On the other hand, increased competition between banks with respect to
shareholder value may exacerbate the problem of excessive risk-taking.
Principal-agent problems are common in financial contracts, including deposit insur-
ance.  In general a problem can arise where an agent pursues his/her own interests
rather than those of the principal who he/she is supposed to be representing. Because
of the multiplicity of parties involved in deposit insurance, a number of principal-
agent problems arise. For example, as illustrated in Table 3 below, the deposit insur-
ance agency is supposed to protect depositors, but may be unduly influenced by
member institutions. Thus the public needs to be able to hold the deposit insurer
accountable for its actions. The government should promote financial stability, but
may be pressured by industry supporters to pursue their objectives. It too needs to
be publicly accountable.  The central bank may have different objectives from those
of the deposit insurer in that the central bank may be more prepared to keep a weak
bank in business in order to avoid a financial crisis, while the deposit insurer would
prefer to close it quickly to limit its exposure to loss. 
Bailouts
It is sometimes argued that the deposit insurance is useful because it makes it easier
to close failed banks—there will be less of a public outcry. As Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz (hms, 2000) argue financial crises are endemic and bailouts are everywhere a
potentially serious problem. hms posit that here are two kinds of countries—those
that have deposit insurance and those that do not know that they have it. Attempts
to curb the moral hazard of deposit insurance will succeed only if the authorities’
pledge not to bail out banks, particularly large banks, is credible.  That pledge will
not be credible where some banks are seen to be ‘too-big-to-let-fail,’ which is a par-
ticular problem in highly concentrated financial systems.  In these situations, a com-
bination of insurance backed by a mix of regulatory instruments and supervisory
interventions offers the best hope for constraining over-zealous risk-taking. 
The international community has developed a number of good practices to quell the
adverse consequences of protection.5 These are discussed further in Section 3 below.
The case for investor protection
The macroeconomic repercussions of a loss of investor confidence are less evident.
Unlike banks, investment firms (such as stock brokers and investment funds) have
not been regarded as ‘special,’ because they were less important to many economies,
and because they were less subject to runs because their assets were transparent and
their liabilities could not be quickly redeemed without cost. However, the recent
blurring of distinctions between banks and non-bank financial institutions means
that non-banks now have an increasing importance in supplying credit and offering
instruments that are comprised in the money supply. Moreover, non-banks also,
12 Occasional Studies 2.2especially those offering money market mutual funds, may be exposed to runs. Con-
sequently, there are macroeconomic policy reasons for avoiding a loss of confidence
at non-bank financial firms. In addition, guarantees for investors are offered as an
element of consumer protection to level the playing field for both banks and non-
banks.
The case for regulating pensions and insurance
The pension and insurance markets are already regulated to improve their sound-
ness, reduce their probability of failure, and protect their customers from loss. Nev-
ertheless failures can occur. Those seeking a level playing field for financial firms and
protection for their customers can make a case for guaranteeing pensioners and
insurance policy holders. Insurance and pension companies appear to be less vul-
nerable than banks in that the duration of their assets and liabilities is less mis-
matched than banks. Insurance companies’ (particularly life insurance companies’)
liabilities are long term, so they are less vulnerable to irrational runs leading to
liquidity problems. Market discipline is costly. An insurance policy holder with jus-
tified concern about his insurance company’s condition incurs a high cost when he
surrenders his policy at a price that typically lies well below both face value and the
accumulated value of premiums paid. This fact implies that a run on an insurance
fund will increase the firm’s liquidity, in contrast to the situation for banks and
mutual funds. Still, claims on mutual funds with a life insurance component could
be withdrawn quickly, and forced liquidation to meet redemption demands might
depress the values received by investors. Also, if the insurance company’s cash
inflows drop off as a result of a decline in new business and renewal rates, it might
be forced to liquidate assets prematurely. This might also depress asset prices and
exacerbate the company’s liquidity problems. Finally, one might argue that because
of the close links between banks and insurance companies and their products, prob-
lems at insurance companies may harm the reputation of banks and so lead to bank
runs. Moreover, from a consumer protection point of view, it can be argued that
guaranteeing life insurance policies is no less important than guaranteeing securities
investments, as life insurance is merely a specific form of investing and life insurance
policy holders are no more sophisticated than investors.
If market discipline by life insurance policyholders is inhibited by its high cost, it is
virtually impossible for future pensioners in the Netherlands. In compulsory pen-
sion schemes, like most of the schemes in the Netherlands, employees cannot run
from their pension commitments without relinquishing the associated job. As a
result, market discipline by (future) pensioners, that is those who are paying current
premiums, is, in fact, non-existent. Workers can exert market discipline only at an
unreasonably high cost, namely through labour mobility. Consequently, guaran-
teeing life insurance policies and pensions might be considered not from a fear of
runs within the industry but for reasons of consumer protection and concern for a
contagious loss of reputation within and among financial conglomerates. 
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Any organization providing a guarantee takes on a financial obligation that can be
onerous and potentially destructive if not managed properly.  Conceptually, there
are three ways for the guarantor to limit its exposure to loss: by (1) taking collateral,
closely monitoring its value, and seizing it if the guaranteed party defaults on its
commitments; (2) restricting the assets and the activities of the guaranteed party; and
(3) assessing insurance charges that are adjusted for risk and adequately compensate
the guarantor.6
For the guarantor of financial institutions to exercise the first control option, it must
be able to withdraw the guaranteed institution’s license when (or preferably just
before) it becomes book-value insolvent and dispose of its assets in a cost-effective
manner. This threat is not credible in a banking system that is highly concentrated
and/or has state-owned institutions. In some eu-countries, such as Sweden, Finland,
Greece, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium, the banking and insurance systems
are heavily concentrated. Other countries with somewhat less concentrated systems,
notably France, Germany and Italy, have a history of state-owned banks. On the one
hand, because the failure of a large bank in a highly concentrated system would auto-
matically create systemic instability and rescue could be expensive, there is an incen-
tive for the supervisor to prevent failure by increased supervisory and monitoring
activities. On the other hand, a high degree of concentration may lead owners, man-
agers and customers to believe that their institution is ‘too big to fail’– a belief that
can lead to excessive risk-taking, insufficient market discipline, and reduced sound-
ness. The same problems can occur at state-owned banks. In fact, a too-big-to-fail
policy can be regarded as an implicit guarantee for all stakeholders, including share-
holders. Moreover, monitoring under option 1 is sufficient to protect the guarantor
only where the guaranteed party’s assets are liquid so that the guarantor can dispose
of them readily with little loss. This is not the case for most bank assets; conse-
quently, the guarantor needs the bank to maintain a not-insignificant capital cush-
ion to protect them both from insolvency. The second option for guarding the guar-
antor’s solvencyærestricting assets and activities – is also largely unavailable in a
universal banking system dominated by conglomerates, as is frequently the case in
Europe. For these reasons, guarantee systems in Europe have come to rely heavily
on capital requirements and increasingly on risk-based premiums under option 3.
2.3  Legitimate Objectives for Depositor and Investor Protection: eu vs. us
The Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Deposit Insurance (wgdi) began
its work in late 1998 by examining the goals that Working Group members set for
their systems of deposit protection. The Group compiled a list of 26 different objec-
tives.7 Clearly, one single supervisory tool can only achieve a very limited num-
beræobjective. The group found that Group members mentioned financial stability
14 Occasional Studies 2.2and small depositor protection most frequently as their objectives. The Group
regarded these two objectives as compatible and therefore, legitimate, and achiev-
able in a well-designed guarantee system.8
The relative emphasis that a country places on financial stability, as compared to
consumer protection, will influence the design of its system of protection. In the
context of the European Union, deposit and investor protection are more a matter
of consumer protection than financial stability as is reflected in the eu Directives’
focus on the creation of harmonized financial markets. The emphasis may also be a
reflection of the history and characteristics of the European financial system, where
concentration, state-ownership and political philosophy have all led to a reluctance
to let its banks (especially its large banks) fail and indeed where financial firms in the
past have not often failed, especially in comparison to the us. (Figure 1 illustrates the
typically heavier concentration in the banking industry in European countries as
compared to that in the us.) In countries where financial firms fail infrequently, there
will be less of a need to design customer protection systems to be a tool of financial
safety and soundness. Consequently, in Europe, instead of designing protection sys-
tems to avoid moral hazard, adverse selection and agency problems, these pitfalls are
countered and financial stability is ensured more by capital-adequacy and other reg-
ulatory requirements, and their strict enforcement by strong financial supervisors,
and, in Germany at least, by monitoring by peer institutions.
In the United States, on the other hand, deposit insurance is seen as having an
15
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Chart 1  Bank concentration in the eu and the us












Source: ecb, g10important role to play in promoting financial stability. There is skepticism in the
academic and regulatory communities in the United States about the effectiveness
of regulation and supervision in ensuring soundness in a financial system still char-
acterized by roughly 8,000 commercial banks, 1,500 savings associations, and 10,000
credit unions (see for example Dale 2000a). The consensus view is that protection
systems need to be designed to allow market discipline to counter deposit insur-
ance’s well-known bugbears. 
2.4  The Confluence of Factors Demanding Reform9
Advances in finance theory have led to the creation of a myriad of new financially
engineered products. Technological change in the collection, processing and trans-
mission of information has made it feasible to offer these new financial instruments
to customers. This process, in combination with the deregulation of the financial
sector, has caused a blurring of distinctions among financial products and the finan-
cial services firms that offer them. Further, the liberalization of capital markets has
opened up trading areas across national borders as improvements in information
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Chart 2  Consolidation in Nine European Countries
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Source:  Constructed by the authors from G 10 data for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the u.k.technology have drastically lowered the cost of communication. As a result, inter-
national activities by financial institutions have become not only legally permitted,
but also economically profitable.10 Figure 2 illustrates the trend of consolidation in
Europe. It shows the yearly number of mergers and take-overs in the financial indus-
try in nine European countries in the period 1900-1999.
In short, cross-border activities and the establishment of increasingly concentrated
financial conglomerates have resulted in a financial landscape that is much changed
in 2003 as compared to that 20 or even 10 years ago. At the same time, as a result of
both banking crises and developments in economic theory, a greater appreciation
has arisen of the dangers of offering ill-designed systems of protection. As a result,
supervisory systems around the world are being revised extensively in order to sub-
due risks in the changed financial landscape. 
In turn, the new supervisory systems are reconsidering the organization and struc-
ture of systems of protection for depositors, investors, pensioners, and insurance pol-
icyholders. At the same time, a number of developments have emphasized the
importance of the protection for the consumers of financial products during the
1990s, both in the eu and in the Netherlands. Partly as a result of the stock market
boom, the proportion of less sophisticated investors increased during the 1990s.
Moreover, increasingly complicated financial products have become available.
Hence the protection of consumers of financial products has gained importance.
Also, the failures of bcci and Barings, scandals involving large firms (Parmalat) in
Europe and in the United States (Enron, WorldCom and others) and even the sus-
picions of insider trading at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange have made society
increasingly aware of the potential adverse effects of a lack of integrity in financial
markets.11euDirectives on deposit guarantees and investor protection, aiming at har-
monization, a level playing field, and the prevention of regulatory arbitrage, have
established constraints on member countries’ freedom in making revisions to their
systems of protection.
17
Depositor and investor protection in The Netherlands: past, present and future3  History of deposit insurance and investor
protection in the European union
3.1  Introduction
This chapter provides some history of deposit insurance and investor protection in
the European Union—a subject that has not attracted much attention to date and on
which it is difficult to obtain information. The chapter discusses the eu-directives
and describes how countries have responded to these directives and to the changes
in the financial environment. It is structured as follows. The next section describes
chronologically the introduction and harmonisation of depositor protection in the
eu. Section 3.3 discusses the expansions of financial protection beyond the home
country and to other types of financial instruments in addition to deposits.  For
those readers that are interested in developments in individual countries, sections
3.4 through 3.8 describe the systems of depositor and investor protection in selected
eu-countries - Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the uk in more detail. Section
3.9 summarises the chapter.  
3.2  First steps toward introduction and harmonisation of depositor protection
In general, Western European systems of protection for banks started typically in the
late 1970s or early 1980s, although Belgium, Germany and Norway had initiated sys-
tems earlier.  The systems that originated in this period tended to be bare-bones,
offering protection only to depositors, only in a country’s major financial institu-
tionsæand only to depositors that were resident in the country offering the guaran-
tee.12 The systems bestowed some degree of consumer protection while attempting
to strengthen systemic stability. In almost all other respects, the systems initiated at
this time were diverse in composition.  
Subsequently, eu countries have revised their systems of protection in response to
the eu directives on deposit insurance and investor protection. An overview of these
directives is given in Table 1. 
The revisions introduced a degree of harmonisation among the systems and expand-
ed them. Although countries in Europe initially enacted very different systems and
responded to the eu directives of 1994 and 1997 in somewhat different ways, there are
18 Occasional Studies 2.2a number of commonalities with regard to depositor and investor protection in
Europeæthe time of initiation, its mandatory nature, the minimum coverage level
applied to the sum of a depositor’ accounts at a failed bank, the similar exclusions,
and home country responsibility.
The commonalities were not a coincidence, but reflected the influence of discus-
sions and Directives at the eu level. A first commonality is that a number of systems
commenced at roughly the same time. In the 1970s the European Commission sub-
mitted the question of deposit insurance to a group of experts. Their discussions
were encouraged by the unfortunate experience of bank failures in some of Euro-
pean economies. Depositors lost money and complained bitterly, for example, dur-
ing the 1970s secondary banking crisis in the United Kingdom. Creditors in western
time zones lost money when Bankhaus Herstatt failed in Germany in 1974. Spain
experienced a serious banking crisis from 1977 to 1985. A bank was rescued in Italy in
1974 and its mode of resolution proved to be highly controversial. Banco
Ambrosiano, an Italian bank chartered in Luxembourg, failed in 1982, illustrating the
dangers of banks falling through the gaps in international regulation and foretelling
the 1991 demise of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (bcci).
Following its early discussions, the Commission publicly addressed the matter of
deposit insurance in a 1985 proposal on the reorganisation and winding up of credit
institutions. The proposals on deposit insurance therein were very limited and were
not welcomed.  Nevertheless, the experience of bank failures and the fact that
deposit insurance discussions were underway encouraged the adoption of new sys-
tems of protection, usually for bank depositors in the home state. In the period
19
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Table 1  Timetable eu-harmonisation of deposit and investor protection
Proposal/directive Aim
1986 Recommendation on deposit insurance Encouragement of introduction of
deposit insurance
1994 Council Directive on Deposit-guarantee Consumer protection and
Schemes systemic  stability; eu-wide
coverage for credit institutions
1994 Proposal on Investor Compensation  Extend protection to securities
schemes 
1997  Directive on Investor Protection  A harmonised minimum level of 
Schemes protection for the small investorbetween 1977 and 1983, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom initiated systems of deposit protection. In the same period, Bel-
gium and Germany revised the systems that they had begun earlier. 
The process of initiation of deposit insurance systems was further encouraged when,
in 1986, the European Commission issued a formal Recommendation on deposit
insurance that aimed to encourage the adoption of deposit guarantee schemes in all
member states. 13 No maximum or minimum level of coverage was posited, and cov-
erage was to be territorial with responsibility falling to the host country’s monetary
authorities, as an extension of their responsibility for monetary policy and lending
of last resort. 
At this juncture, seven member states (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) already had systems in place. Den-
mark, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg adopted the Recommendation, however, and
initiated systems of deposit protection between 1987 and 1989. The recommendation
was not universally accepted; Greece and Portugal still lacked systems when the time
period for implementing the recommendation had expired. These two countries put
them in place only in 1993 and 1992, respectively.14
In June 1992, the European Community (ec ) followed its earlier Recommendation
with a proposal for a Council Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes. The propos-
al was amended in December 1992 and again in March 1993 before being enacted in
May 1994. The stated objectives were to provide some degree of consumer protec-
tion while also strengthening systemic stability.15 Nevertheless, it is clear that an
important motivating factor was a desire to harmonise, that is, to level the playing
field for, the development of credit institutions within a single European banking
market. 
3.3  Expansions of protection in the eu
Any bare-bones system of deposit insurance will cover resident depositors in the
most important of a country’s financial intermediariesæusually its commercial or
universal banks. Such a system can expand its scope in three directions: by (1) cov-
ering depositors in other types of depository or nondepository financial institutions,
(2) extending coverage beyond the home country, and (3) including other types of
financial instruments in addition to deposits.  
In the United States, the first and third types of expansion have occurred. Federal
deposit insurance commenced at commercial banks in 1934, but a separate system
was soon added for savings and loan associations and a third scheme was created for
credit unions in 1970.16 Although these three systems insure only deposits, a separate
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quently, in addition, each State in the u.s. now maintains a guarantee fund to pro-
tect policyholders at insurance companies. To date, these five systems of protection
(for banks, savings associations, credit unions, securities firms, and insurance com-
panies) have all remained separate.17 Moreover, there is no movement to combine
protection for depositors, investors or insurance-policy holders or to extend cover-
age to deposits taken outside the United States. 
The situation has developed differently in Europe, however. In order to view the sit-
uation in the Netherlands against the background of protection in the eu, this sec-
tion examines how similar expansions of guaranteed coverage have occurred in
European countries though the promulgation of two eu Directives: the 1994 Direc-
tive on deposit-guarantee schemes and the 1997 Directive on investor protection
schemes. There is, as yet, no general directive to protect policyholders at insurance
companies in the eu.
The 1994 EU Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes
The systems put into operation in the early years of protection in Europe varied con-
siderably from country to country.18 This led to the 1994eudirective on deposit guar-
antee schemes, which aimed to harmonise, at a minimal level, the systems in place.
The directive was also prompted partly by a second experience of bank failures in
the region – this time in the early 1990s. For example, during the late 1980s and ear-
ly 1990s, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden experienced major banking crises that led
the latter two countries to place full guarantees on bank liabilities – guarantees that
subsequently were replaced by limited systems of depositor protection.
But it was the closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (bcci) in
July 1991 that was instrumental in the design of the 1994 Directive. bcci was regis-
tered in Luxembourg, had its operational head quarters in London and operated sub-
sidiaries/affiliates in 69 countries. The legal division of responsibility allowed the
authorities in Luxembourg and the United Kingdom to ‘pass the buck,’ so that nei-
ther supervised bcci’s operations adequately. In July 1991, however, the authorities
in London closed bcci ’s u.k operations and this led to the withdrawal of funds from
small and medium sized u.k. banks. ‘Within three years, a quarter of the banks in
this sector had, in some sense, failed.’19 The closure of bbci´s headquarters in Lux-
embourg led to the failure of its branches abroad. For example, bcci failed in the
Netherlands and was, in fact, the last bank to fail in that country. 
Following the experience with bcci, the 1994 eu Directive translated the concept of
‘home country control’ into the field of deposit insurance. It aimed to provide pro-
tection to depositors of branches situated in a State other than that of the head office
and to establish the responsibility of the home country scheme, not only to super-
vise the bank (as directed elsewhere), but also to compensate its depositors at a failed
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ed coverage to depositors at branches of member countries’ banks operating within
the eu. The Directive thus provided a missing link in the establishment of the single
European banking market by insuring its depositors everywhere in the eu.
Part of the single market objective was the establishment of a harmonised minimum
level of protection. The first harmonisation provision was that it was the obligation
of every credit institution to become a member of a deposit guarantee scheme (unless
it belonged to an alternative scheme that guaranteed its solvency). Mandatory mem-
bership was considered necessary to prevent runs by depositors that could lead to
financial instability. Nevertheless, the directive lists certain classes of depositors that
may be omitted from the scheme.  The rationale for the exclusion of such deposi-
tors is that they do not need, or deserve, social protection. A large number of mem-
ber countries have chosen to adopt the Directive’s list of optional exclusions. 
Expansion beyond the bare-bones level of instruments covered by the guarantee was
required by both the 1994 Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes and the 1997
Directive on investor-protection schemes. For example, Article 1 of the 1994eudirec-
tive on deposit-guarantee schemes, defines a deposit as ‘any credit balance which
results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from nor-
mal banking transaction and which the credit institution must repay under legal and
contractual conditions applicable, and any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by
a credit institution.’ The definition also extends to shares held in u.k.and Irish build-
ing Societies. This is a relatively wide definition of a deposit.
In a third harmonisation provision, the 1994 Directive also required the extension of
coverage beyond banks to other forms of depository or credit institutions. Article 1
defines a credit institution as ‘an undertaking the business of which is to receive
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own
account.’ This definition would encompass savings banks, mortgage banks, credit
unions, and other credit institutions dealing with the public. These definitions
would require countries to broaden their deposit insurance scheme, or schemes, to
cover all instruments fitting the definition of a deposit in any and all types of insti-
tutions fitting the definition of a credit institution. 
It was mentioned above that many systems of protection in Western Europe began
at about the same time. A fourth commonality is that systems of protection are
mandatory within the eu. The Directive required countries to maintain or introduce
a system and to officially recognise it. Moreover, the Directive set home-country
responsibility for providing a minimum level of coverage, placed a temporary ban
on exporting high coverage, allowed branches of foreign banks to top up their cov-
er by joining the host country scheme, established three mandatory exclusions on
own funds, interbank and money-laundered deposits, provided a list of optional
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depositors.
The 1994 Directive left plenty of room for countries to tailor their system(s) of pro-
tection to local circumstances. Little attention was paid to combating moral hazard
through coinsurance,20 limiting coverage, risk-adjusting insurance premiums, or
avoiding bank rescues and bailouts.21 During the negotiations leading to the Direc-
tive, German views prevailed and the proposal for a mandatory ceiling on protec-
tion and for a requirement for coinsurance was rejected, on the grounds that the dan-
gers of moral hazard argument had been overstated. Consequently, the Directive
permits countries to decide whether to choose or avoid coinsurance and it sets no
upper limit on the coverage that countries can offer. Moreover, it exempts credit
institutions from the obligation to join a system of deposit insurance, where their
solvency was protected by an alternative system, as in the case of Germany’s savings
and co-operative banks.22
By imposing an unambitious, three-month, deadline for compensation, the Direc-
tive allows variability in the timing of payouts.  It puts no pressure on member coun-
tries to provide u.s.-style three-day compensation.
The Directive also imposes some ambiguous restrictions on advertising that permit
countries to adopt different standards with respect to competition through adver-
tising and to leave the possibility that depositors are insufficiently informed about
their rights.  For example, in its preamble the Directive states, ‘Whereas, informa-
tion is an essential element in depositor protection and must therefore be the sub-
ject of a minimum number of binding provisions, whereas, however, the unregulat-
ed use in advertising of references to the amount and scope of a deposit-guarantee
scheme could affect the stability of the banking system or depositor confidence;
whereas Member States should therefore lay down rules to limit such references.’
The Directive also gives members latitude in regard to financing the schemes they
establish, while discouraging the use of government funds for this purpose. In the
words of the Preamble, ‘Whereas it is not indispensable, in this Directive, to har-
monise the methods of financing schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institu-
tions themselves, given, on the one hand, that the cost of financing such schemes
must be borne, in principle, by credit institutions themselves and that, on the oth-
er hand, that the financing must be in proportion to their liabilities; whereas this
must not, however, jeopardise the stability of the banking system of the member
State concerned.’
Finally, the Directive sets a somewhat contradictory obligation for a Member gov-
ernment to establish and officially recognise a system of deposit protection, but
exempts it from any obligation to support it financially—even in a crisis. In fact,
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result in the member States’ or their competent authorities’ being made liable in
respect of depositors if they have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing
deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or protec-
tion of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Directive have been intro-
duced and officially recognised.’
Following the 1994 Directive, which was adopted also by non-eu members of the
European Economic Area, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom all amended their systems of deposit protection in 1995 or 1996. Germany and
Luxembourg were rather later in making changes (in 1998 and 1999, respectively). The
amendments in Denmark, Finland and Sweden most probably reflected primarily
these countries’ experiences with extensive guarantees granted during their financial
crises in the early and mid-1990s. In the absence of definitive data, the authors can
only conjecture, however, that most countries needed to make changes to conform
to the 1994 eu directive on deposit-protection schemes.
Some countries, for example, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, did not
make substantial changes to their systems of protection at this time.23Belgium under-
took a moderate list of revisions to its old-established systems of protection. Other
countries, Germany and Italy, for example, found it necessary to make more signif-
icant changes to conform to the eu Directive. These two countries, like Denmark
and France, might need to consider making adjustments if only because they offered
higher than minimum eu coverage and overprotection may create moral hazard and
because the directive temporarily prohibited exporting high coverage. Sweden had
experienced a serious banking crisis in the early 1990s and introduced unlimited cov-
erage to prevent a melt-down in the bankingsystem. In response to the 1994euDirec-
tive Sweden created a new system of limited protection. Unfortunately, data about
changes undertaken by the eu-countries are far from complete. Based on the avail-
able data, sections 3.4 through 3.8 describe the changes undertaken by selected coun-
tries.  
The 1997 Directive on Investor Protection Schemes
A blurring of distinctions between financial firms and financial products as the 1990s
progressed caused the eu to decide that it had become difficult to separately identi-
fy deposits from other forms of consumer savings and credit institutions from oth-
er financial firms.  Moreover, the eu considered that these other financial instru-
ments, held at other types of financial institutions, warranted protection. 
Consequently, investor protection was one of the objectives of the 1993 Directives
on Investment Services and Capital Adequacy that required that an investment firm
must be authorised to be fit and proper and sufficiently capitalised in its home State
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to be insufficient to protect investors in all circumstances.  Thus, the European Par-
liament and Council issued a proposal on Investor Compensation schemes and reis-
sued it in amended form in 1994. Ultimately, the eu Parliament enacted a second
protection Directiveæthat of March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes. This
Directive provided ‘a harmonised minimum level of protection at least for the small
investor in the event of an investment firm being unable to meet its obligations to
its investor clients.’25
Article 1 of the 1997 Directive defines an investor as ‘any person who has entrusted
money or instruments to an investment firm in connection with investment busi-
ness.’ In turn, an investment firm is defined as in eu Directive 93/22/eecas ‘any legal
person the regular occupation or business of which is the provision of investment
services for third parties on a professional basis.’26
Apart from extending coverage to additional types of financial instruments held at
an enlarged group of financial institutions, the 1997 Directive attempted to enact
provisions that paralleled those of the 1994 Directive. Thus, it required mandatory
participation, established home country responsibility, temporarily prohibited com-
petition through exporting higher coverage for fear of moral hazard, allowed branch-
es of foreign banks to top up their coverage, provided for a minimum level of cov-
erage (ecu20,000) with three mandatory and a number of optional exclusions,
permitted coinsurance, allowed diversity in funding arrangements, restricted adver-
tising, but required the provision of information to investors, and relied on the prin-
ciple of  caveat emptor.
Given the prevalence of universal banking in Europe, the broadened definitions that
governed membership in a protection scheme and also the instruments it encom-
passed would require countries to offer coverage in both banks and securities firms.
Countries needed to decide how best to do that. All member countries revised their
systems subsequently, typically setting up a separate scheme for securities firms. In the
cases of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the resulting changes were more
extensive than those required for these two countries in order to conform to the 1994
eu Directive (see below). The uk decided to integrate its separate systems in 2001. 
Protection for Insurance Policyholders27
There is, as yet, no general directive requiring protection for policyholders in the
insurance industry.  However, the blurring of distinctions between financial prod-
ucts can be expected to inspire policy makers to think about this issue. Moreover,
the decline in equity values world-wide is likely to reduce the value of insurance com-
panies’ (particularly life insurance companies’) asset portfolios and may cause sol-
vency problems at weaker institutions.  Such a development might well trigger the
discussion and prompt a third eu Directive to protect insurance policy holders.
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in at least 21 oecd countries. As a rule they are funded. Some systems protect poli-
cyholders (typically in full) in one or a few branches of the insurance industry. These
are established typically where insurance is compulsoryæas in the case of motor
vehicle liability insurance. 28 For members of the eu it is mandated by Article 1 of the
second European directive on compulsory motor vehicle insurance.  Some countries
(France, Italy and Spain) also maintain funds for compulsory insurance covering
hunting accidents, while France, Italy, Japan and Poland have funds to cover class-
es of agricultural or industrial accidents.  These funds usually provide full coverage.
Other systems partially cover most contracts written by participating insurance com-
panies. At the moment only 4 eu countries (France, Ireland, Spain and the u.k.) have
established systems to cover life insurance policyholders. In Ireland and the u.k.,
such coverage is limited to natural persons.  France has applied a cap to the cover-
age offered. The u.k. limits recovery to a percentage of the claim. Ireland imposes
both a cap and coinsurance.29
3.4  Case study: Belgium
Belgium needed to make a number of moderateadjustments to the systems of depos-
itor protection that it had had in operation for almost 60 years. 
The Systems Before the 1994 Directive30
Belgium began a rudimentary system of protection, operated by the Institute de
Reéscompte et de Garantie (the irg) in 1935. The system was formalised with the cre-
ation of a deposit insurance fund in 1974 and by more detailed arrangements in 1985.
At the beginning of 1985, two funds were established, one for banks and one for pri-
vate savings institutions.  Publicly owned institutions were not included. Both
schemes were run by the irg and were financed mainly by member institutions,
although contributions to the fund were retained by banks to be called upon as need-
ed by the fund. Participation was voluntary, but in practice all eligible institutions
belonged. Only deposits in Belgium francs (later in any eu currency) were covered.
Maximum coverage was Bfr500,000 (then equal to ecu11,200) per account; however,
depositors had no legal right to reimbursement, which remained at the discretion of
the irg and would only be considered in the event of a bank’s bankruptcy.  If insuf-
ficient funds were available to compensate a depositor as promised, compensation
would be reduced proportionately to fit available resources. Additional compensa-
tion could then become available at a later date after the irghad called on additional
contributions from members. Belgium used its systems only once, when a savings
bank failed. 
The Systems in Belgium After the 1994 Directive
The new system in Belgium required mandatory participation for all Belgium banks,
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bined into one.  Members were required to send their contributions to the fund,
instead of retaining them in house. Contributions were set at 2% of the deposits tak-
en from clients.  An additional 0.4% could be called in when the fund had insuffi-
cient resources.  However, a credit institution could cease paying premiums when
the sum of its contributions had reached a level of 0.5% of its guaranteed deposits.  
The Belgium government gave a temporary guarantee of bf3 billion to cover the cost
of any intervention that the fund might need to make at a publicly owned credit
institution.  Depositors were given a right to reimbursement when their credit insti-
tution became bankrupt or was otherwise unable to repay the funds it owed. The
guarantee was applied to the sum of a depositor’s accounts at a failed bank and the
coverage limit no longer applied to each account separately.  Belgium adopted eu
the mandatory exclusions (on interbank funds, own funds and money-laundered
accounts) and the list of optional exclusions, including those applicable to deposi-
tors who had obtained non-market concessions from the bank.
Belgium again revised its system of protection in a statute of December 1998.31 The
statute created a Fonds de Protection des Depots et des Instruments Financiers
(fonds) to replace the Institut de Reescompte et de Garantie (irg) The law gave the
fondsthe option of operating separate protection systems for credit institutions and
for investment firms.  In February 1999, the fonds chose to unify the separate sys-
tems of protection into a systeme de protection des depots et des instruments financiers. This
system covers credit institutions, stockbrokers, and asset management firms. 
3.5  Case study: Germany
By the 1990s, Germany already had several systems of protection in operation and
they could not be easily reconciled with the 1994 eu Directive. 
Deposit Insurance in Germany Before the 1994 Directive32
In 1999 the German banking system included three types of banks. Private commer-
cial/universal banks held 25% of system assets. This sector of the market was rela-
tively highly concentratedæthe four largest banks held 57% of private banking assets
in 1999. The German banking system as a whole, however, exhibited low concentra-
tion in 1999 because there were large numbers of savings, co-operative, and other
banks that held 36%, 13%, and 26%, respectively, of system assets. Publicly owned
banks were important: they held over 36% of system assets in 1999.  
Each of the three groups of banks maintained its own voluntary system of deposit
insurance.  The system for private banks was initially organised by the German
Bankers’ Association, following the 1974 failure of Bankhaus Herstatt. The aim was
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ship and explicit guarantee under a scheme run by the Association of Public Banks.
The savings and co-operative banks both also established schemes that protected
their institutions from failure, in addition to guaranteeing deposits in the event of
failure. All of the three systems were voluntary and are financed by premiums levied,
ex ante or ex post, on their members.  
The German System for Private Banks
The private system was funded both ex ante and ex post. The premium of 0.03% of
liabilities could be increased up to 250% for riskier banks. There was no public fund-
ing, although experts had commented that it might be forthcoming in an emergency.
Although formally voluntary, non-participants had to disclose this fact, which
imposed a strong incentive to join.  Yet members could be expelled by their peers.
Coverage in the scheme for private banks was set at 30% of capital.33 Both domestic
and foreign depositors were covered in domestic and foreign currency and in both
domestic and foreign branches of member banks.  Thus there was little or no mon-
itoring by depositors, whose discipline was replaced by that exercised by the other
members of each particular fund.  
The scheme offered no statutory right to compensation; nevertheless, no depositor
has ever been refused reimbursement and no member bank has been denied finan-
cial assistance. The scheme was run privately under the bylaws of a private associa-
tion, and in fact operated like a club.34 It had no public supervision, was run by 10
commissioners, and could expel members for supplying wrongful information or for
being consistently ranked in the weakest risk category. Members operated conserva-
tively because of peer monitoring, the risk of expulsion, strong offsite supervision
by the Federal Supervisory Office (fso) and the Bundesbank, and a legal system that
severely punished bankruptcy.
The German Response to the 1994 EU Directive
The systems of protection in place in Germany deviated from the requirements of
the 1994 eu Directive in a number of respects. Rather than adjust its systems, Ger-
many initially objected to the Directive, in general, on the grounds that there was
no need for a Community measure because national steps were sufficient. In par-
ticular, Germany objected to the Directive’s export prohibition. The deposit insur-
ance system for private German banks offered very high coverage. The export pro-
hibition would, therefore, require German banks operating in other eu countries to
reduce the cover they offered. That would impede the ability of German banks to
compete abroad. The eu’s topping-up provision would enable branches of foreign
banks operating in Germany to obtain much higher coverage than they offered at
home. This provision would expose Germany’s generous system of compensation
to bank failures arising from less-than-adequate home-country supervision and to
foreign banks that maintained riskier profiles than the conservative German banks.
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because the German systems, with voluntary membership, had operated successful-
ly since 1976.  In fact, in 1993, the system run by the German Bankers’ Association
omitted only five banks that held relatively few deposits.
Germany took its general and particular objections to the European Court. It argued,
first, that the Directive violated the ec Treaty; second, that the authors had given
insufficient reasons for its provisions; third, that the export prohibition was incom-
patible with the Community’s objective of providing a high level of consumer pro-
tection, and, fourth, that it was contrary to the Treaty’s principle of proportionali-
ty. The German Government argued that the topping up provision infringed the
Second Banking Directive’s principle of home country supervision and the Treaty’s
principle of proportionality. With regard to the Directive’s obligation for compul-
sory membership, Germany argued, first, that it violated the ec Treaty’s principle of
proportionality because Germany already had a ‘well-established national practice’
in a deposit insurance scheme with voluntary membership, and, second, that it
imposed an excessive burden on credit institutions.
The Court rejected all of the German arguments and dismissed both the general and
the specific applications for annulment.35 Thus, in order to comply with the 1994
Directive, Germany enacted the Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act
in August 1998 to implement both the 1994 and the 1997 Directives. The statute estab-
lished two new, compulsory protection schemes (one for private banks and the oth-
er for public banks).  These systems bestow a right to compensation to a limit of
ecu 20,000, with 10% coinsurance. The accounts of other banks and financial insti-
tutions, public bodies and insiders were excluded.  Both schemes were privately man-
aged by the bankers’ associations but fell under the supervision of the Federal Bank-
ing Supervisory Office (fbso).  They were funded by premiums set by the Ministry
of Finance. 
Germany claimed that its privately run schemes did not fall under the eu Directive
because they were not subject to public regulation. Consequently, despite estab-
lishing new systems of protection, the private guarantee systems continue to func-
tion with only minor adjustments. For example, the system for private banks now
insures deposits over ecu20,000, those excluded by coinsurance, and others exclud-
ed from the official scheme. The three schemes for public banks, savings banks, and
co-operative banks continue to function.
3.6  Case study: Italy 36
Until the 1970s, the Italian public was confident that failures would occur only at
small banks. To rescue small failing institutions, a mutual guarantee scheme was set
29
Depositor and investor protection in The Netherlands: past, present and futureup for savings and loan associations in 1927, for agricultural credit associations in
1961, and for co-operative banks in 1978.  The country faced the first post-war possi-
bility of a large bank failure in 1974, when Banca Privata Italiana failed and was res-
cued with public funds.37 The method of intervention was strongly criticised but was
not rectified until after Banco Ambrosiano failed and was rescued in 1982, again using
public funds.  At this time, discussion was under way in the eu about establishment
of deposit insurance community wide.  There was debate in Italy too, but the empha-
sis was on establishing a scheme in order to avoid the use of public funds to bail out
banks.  The discussion crystallised with the failure of Cassa di Risparmio di Prato,
which was placed into receivership in 1988. The Interbank Fund for Deposit Protec-
tion (ifdp) in Italy was initiated in 1987 in order to avoid an anticipated public bailout
of this latest banking casualty.
The System in Italy before the 1994 Directive
The ifdp was run by a consortium of banks that joined voluntarily. Members need-
ed to meet certain prerequisites, could be sanctioned, and expelled. The principle of
host country responsibility was followedæbranches of foreign banks operating in
Italy could join, but branches of Italian banks abroad were not covered. Member-
ship was confined to banks. There was no fund, but banks in the system set aside
resources that combined to a maximum of 4,000 billion lire system-wide (1% of
insured deposits) that could be called in when needed. As there was a limit on con-
tributions, depositors would have no right to reimbursement if resources proved to
be insufficient. In fact, reimbursement was at the fund’s discretion and required
approval by the Bank of Italy. Contributions were not adjusted for risk.  In princi-
ple, coverage was high, at one billion lire (over ecu500,000). In practice, all deposits
up to 8,000 million lire had full coverage. Such coverage was 10 times the European
average and was extended to every account, not to the sum of a depositor’s accounts
at the bank. Moreover, interbank deposits were covered.
The Italian Response to the 1994 EU Directive
The ifdp deviated from eu requirements in a number of respects. It was voluntary,
privately run, operated under the host country responsibility, did not guarantee
depositors a right to compensation, and did not make the mandatory exclusions.
Moreover, it offered very high coverage and thus exposed the system to abuse from
foreign branches topping up their cover and it guaranteed interbank deposits. (In
1998 Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden, in addition to Italy,
had coverage limits that exceeded the eu minimum.)
A legislative decree of 1996 took some major steps to bring Italy into compliance with
the 1994 Directive. It made participation in a deposit insurance scheme mandatory,
reduced the coverage level to 200,000 lire (ecu103,000) per depositor, and made pro-
vision for the mandatory exclusion of interbank deposits, a credit institution’s own
funds, and money laundered deposits.
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cussed further amending their system with the Bank of Italy and the Italian Banking
Association. They considered changing the level of protection and the ex post fund-
ing arrangements and enhancing mechanisms for measuring and controlling risk 38
In the event, the Statutes and By-Laws, enacted in April 2001, made surprisingly few
changes. The Italian scheme continues to be privately run by member banks, but is
officially recognised. It continues to offer high coverage. Article 2 of the statute states
that ‘All Italian banks, except for mutual banks, shall be members of the fund.’ Mem-
bership would appear to be compulsory, yet members can withdraw from the fund
or be expelled from it (Article 5), raising the possibility that a bank could continue
to operate and take deposits while it is uninsured.  It is hard to reconcile this possi-
bility with the requirement in Article 3.1 of the eu 1994 Directive that,
‘Each Member State shall ensure that within its territory one or more deposit-guar-
antee schemes are introduced and officially recognised. Except in circumstances
envisaged in the second subparagraph and in paragraph 4, no credit institution
authorised in that Member State pursuant to Article 3 of Directive 77/780/eec may
take deposits unless it is a member of such a scheme.’39
Moreover, there is a limit placed on the total amount of reimbursements that may
be made in any one year.  Article 27.9 states that that total may not ‘exceed one fourth
of the moneys available for interventions.’  Consequently, depositors have no right
to reimbursement.
The Statute did make a change with regard to funding the scheme. A callable fund,
ranging between 0.4 and 0.8 of repayable funds, replaces ex post assessments. But an
ex post element of funding remains. If the fund falls below its minimum level, banks
are required to replenish it within four years (Article 21). They also have an obliga-
tion to make regular payments to defray the fund’s operating expenses, when
requested. Contributions can be increased, or decreased by 7.5% according to the
institution’s size. Larger institutions pay at a lower rate than smaller institutions.
Contributions are also adjusted according to indicators representing the adequacy
of the institution’s provisions for losses and its capital adequacy.
3.7  Case study: Sweden
Sweden experienced a serious banking crisis in the early 1990s and placed a full guar-
antee on bank liabilities to avoid a melt-down in the banking system.  The 1994 eu
Directive necessitated that Sweden create a system of limited protection, ab initio.
The new deposit guarantee scheme, designed to conform to the Directive, was enact-
ed in 1995 and came into effect on January 1, 1996.  It guarantees deposits at credit
institutions and those securities firms that are permitted to receive cash deposits
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deposits (of both natural and legal persons) and not to adopt the eu’s option list of
exclusions. Coverage, at sek250,000 or eur 27,08640, is higher than the eu minimum.
The depositor does not need to submit a claim for reimbursement and there is no pro-
vision for offsetting a depositor’s debts to the bankrupt institution against his deposit. 
The Deposit Guarantee Board maintains a fund, for which it has a target of 2.5% of
insured deposits, and charges premiums that are adjusted for risk, as measured by
capital adequacy. The fees are designed to cover both administrative costs and antic-
ipated compensation. The Board has a right to borrow from the National Debt
Office, if necessary, and it invests its accumulated resources there. It is a separate and
independent body with a small staff housed at the Financial Supervisory Authority
and reports to the Ministry of Finance. The Board has made agreements with the
Riksbank, the Financial Supervisory Authority and the National Debt Office to bor-
row staff if a bank fails.
The 1997 eu Directive on investor compensation schemes caused Sweden to enact
new legislation which came into effect on May 1, 1999. It covers securities (to sek
250,000  worth Euro29,200 in 1999) held at licensed Swedish investment firms and
branches of foreign investment firms operating in Sweden. Beneficiaries have to file
a claim after their firm has been declared bankrupt and can expect payment within
3 months. Members of the scheme pay fees to cover administrative costs to the
Deposit Guarantee Board, which operates the scheme. Ex post assessments are levied
to cover compensation.
3.8  Case study: the uk
Before the reform legislation of 2000, supervision in the United Kingdom was con-
ducted on industry lines by a large number of different bodies.  This regulatory
hodgepodge had ‘been created by a series of piecemeal responses to specific events
or to perceived gaps.’41 Prudential supervision for banks was undertaken by the Bank
of England, for building societies by the Building Societies Commission, and for
insurance firms by the Department of Trade and Industry.  Securities firms were
overseen by the Securities and Investments Board, the Securities Futures Associa-
tion, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, the Personal Invest-
ment Authority and by several Recognised Professional Bodies.  The changing con-
figuration of the financial markets in the u.k., as elsewhere, particularly the
emergence and growing importance of conglomerates, led to a lively discussion of
how best to change supervisory structures and practices.42
The debate broadly saw three approaches to the structure of regulation: institution-
al, functional, and by objective. Under the institutional approach to regulation, dif-
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administered by specialist regulatory agencies. Functional regulation focused on the
type of business undertaken by an institution irrespective of which institutions were
involved. (Thus life insurance was regulated similarly regardless of whether it was
provided by a bank or an insurance company.) This approach required specialist
functional regulators. The third approach was to focus on the objectives being
sought by regulationæconcentrating on prudential, systemic, or conduct-of-business
issues.  While it may well be possible to combine prudential and systemic regula-
tion, conduct of business regulation uses different approaches and cultures and was
therefore a candidate for separate treatment.  The debate also ranged over who
should be the regulator or regulators. Should the Bank of England continue to play
a regulatory role or should a new body (or bodies) take over the job?
In the event, in the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, the United King-
dom chose to consolidate supervision (both prudential and conduct-of-business) for
all financial firms in one regulatory/supervisory bodyæthe Financial Services
Authority (fsa).  The Bank of England retained authority for systemic stability, in
addition to its monetary policy responsibilities.  
Depositor and Investor Protection before the 1997 Directive
At the same time, the U.K decided to reorganise its several systems of protection for
depositors, insurance policyholders, and investors. Until the end of 2001, there were
separate protection schemes for depositors in commercial banks, in building soci-
eties, in friendly associations, for investors in securities firms, for policyholders at
insurance companies, and for pensioners. 
These schemes had met with varying degrees of success. For example, the banks’
Deposit Protection Board needed to demand L80 million in ex post levies from its
members in 1992 to compensate consumers at failed banks. The Investors’ Com-
pensation Scheme made levies totalling L224.5 million in order to pay compensation
over the five-year period 1997-2001. The Policy Holders’ Protection Board made
levies of L341.7 million in the four-year period 1992-1995 to cover the reimbursements
it made.
Protection in the U.K. After the 1997 Directive 
The statute of 2000 created a new bodyæthe Financial Services Compensation
Scheme (fscs).  The fscs’s web site [www.fscs.org.uk] describes its role as that of ‘a
safety net for customers of authorised financial services firms.’ It combines under
one roof the many predecessor protection schemes. It ‘can pay compensation if an
authorised firm is unable, or likely to be unable, to pay claims against it’ that is, in
general, if the firm is insolvent or has gone out of business. The scheme covers
deposits, insurance policies and investments. It became operative in December 2001
when the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 went into effect.  It covers firms
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home-country regulator. It is funded by ex ante levies on authorised firms.
There are limits on the compensation that can be paid. The limits, which vary from
scheme to scheme, apply to the sum of each depositor’s, policyholder’s, or investor’s
holdings in a failed firm. For deposit-taking firms the limit is l31,700 (eur 50,700),
including l2,000 in full, plus 90% of the next l33,000 (or eur 52,800 at 2004 exchange
rates). For claims against insurance firms, the limit is l2,000 in full plus 90% of the
balance, except that compulsory insurance is covered in full. Claims against an
investment firm are covered to l48,000 or eur 76,800 (that is, 100% of the first
l30,000 plus 90% of the next l20,000).  The scheme covers private individuals and
small businesses. Those seeking compensation have to file a claim in order to be con-
sidered for reimbursement.
The scheme has three subgroups of member institutions, each with different premi-
um obligations. The first group consists of institutions that accept deposits, the sec-
ond group consists of firms in the insurance business and the third is for designated
investment firms. These groups broadly correspond to the former Deposit Protection
Scheme, the Policyholders’ Protection Scheme, and the Investors’ Compensation
Scheme, which were replaced by the fscs in December 2001. A financial firm’s contri-
butions are determined by its sub-group, but it can belong to more than one subgroup. 
The ex ante levies on participating firms cover general and specific management
expenses and payments for compensation.  Specific management expenses and com-
pensation costs are funded only by members in the appropriate group. Levies to cov-
er compensation expenses are forward looking. The fscs estimates its compensation
costs, in excess of the existing fund balance, during the upcoming 12 months and sets
its premiums accordingly. It expects to impose only one levy a year but can make
additional calls on member resources should the need arise.43 The annual limits on
levies to cover compensation are: (1) for depository firms, 0.3% of a participant firms’
protected deposits; (2) for insurance firms, 0.8% of a participant firm’s net premium
income from protected policies; and (3) for investment firms, the total levy must not
exceed L400 million. Levies are not adjusted for the risk that an individual institu-
tion poses to its fund. A firm will be allocated to a subgroup according to its ‘regu-
lated permissions’ and ‘could be allocated to one or more Contribution Groups, and
therefore, Sub-Schemes, by virtue of its permitted activities.’44
The fscs is governed by a board of 10 directors appointed by the fsa. Nevertheless,
it is meant to be independent of the fsa. The appointment of the Chairman of the
fscs is subject to approval by the Treasury Department. Although the fscs is inde-
pendent of the fsa, it is accountable to it and ultimately to the Treasury. The fscs
has set up three industry committees to advise it, one each for the deposit, insur-
ance, and investment segments.
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This chapter has described the history of depositor and investor protection in the
countries of the European Union. From this brief overview and research by Garcia
for the imf45 it can be concluded that deposit insurance systems in the eu tend to be
older than those in many other parts of the world (the us and Canada excluded), are
more frequently privately run, funded ex post, and offer lower coverage when mea-
sured in terms of Gross Domestic Product per capita than most other regions of the
world.46 The system in the Netherlands shares these two latter characteristics.  
Between 1995 and 2000, in Europe there has been convergence towards some of the
practices favoured by the Financial Stability Forum and often recommended in its
technical assistance by the imf.47 Harmonised eu-directives were aimed at establish-
ing minimum standards for deposit insurance system. In addition to those condi-
tions, some countries made further improvements toward internationally accepted
best practises. The improvements included making membership compulsory, main-
taining a deposit insurance fund, relating the coverage limit to the sum of a deposi-
tor’s holdings in a bank, and charging premiums related to risk in mature protection
systems.48 In June 2001, Maxwell Stamp PLC submitted a report to the eu Commis-
sion on the compliance of countries in the European Economic Area (EEA) with the
1994 Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes. Maxwell Stamp’s final report con-
cluded, ‘All countries are compliant with the spirit of the Directive, and indeed most
are compliant with the particular articles.’ 49
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Netherlands
4.1  Introduction
The harmonised directives, while establishing minimum standards, do give nation-
al authorities ample discretion in designing their financial protection schemes. This
chapter will describe how the systems in the Netherlands have evolved over time,
and will assess where they confirm to internationally accepted standards, and what
improvements toward good practices are possible. It is structured as follows. To put
the analysis in a historical perspective, the next section will briefly describes the ear-
ly history of the financial protection schemes in the Netherlands. Section 4.3 lists
the factors that have influenced changes to the original system of 1978. Section 4.4
describes in detail the current schemes in place in the Netherlands in 2003. Section
4.5 gives an assessment of these schemes against the backdrop of internationally
accepted good practices. Section 4.6 draws conclusions.
4.2  Early history 
Discussions concerning the introduction of deposit insurance date back in the
Netherlands to 1965, following the merger of four large banks that prompted debate on
the need to revise the existing 1956 Act on Supervision.  A second trigger for introduc-
ing deposit insurance was the bankruptcy of a small Amsterdam bank, Teixeira de Mat-
tos, in 1966. The fact that depositors lost their money was covered extensively in the
press and dnb was heavily criticised. A third trigger was the debate on deposit insur-
ance being conducted by the European Commission, as discussed in Section 2 above.
A revised Act on Supervision was not enacted until 1978, however, following slow and
deliberate debate and subsequent additional revision to conform to an eec superviso-
ry directive that was designed to co-ordinate banking legislation across eu countries.
The introduction of a deposit insurance system was, therefore, delayed until the
scheme could be included in the 1978 revised Act on Supervision. Nevertheless, the
Netherlands was one of the first eu members to respond to the discussions underway
in the European Community by establishing a system of deposit insurance.
The system of 1978
The deposit insurance system introduced in 1978 reflected some particular features
of the Dutch financial system. First, the banking market was then dominated by a
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ly impossible to imagine that they would fail. Failures were expected to occur only
among small banks. And, indeed, this expectation has been borne out by subsequent
events. Third, the law required the central bank, which, as the banking supervisor,
was to act as the deposit insurer, to consult with banking trade associations. The asso-
ciations’ views were instrumental in the design of the system.50 The large banks pre-
ferred to share the costs of any such failures among themselves after the event, rather
than contribute to a fund and pay its associated administrative costs.  The large banks
also anticipated that the insurance fund would earn a lower return on the monies
they contributed to it than they, themselves, could earn in house.51
In the Act, the definition of credit institutions was widened to encompass all insti-
tutions that received funds (repayable at less than two years notice) from the public
and granted credit and/or made investments for their own account.  Supervision was
extended to capital market institutions and near banks, such as mortgage banks.
Membership in the deposit insurance system was expanded accordingly. Within a
few years after the introduction of the deposit insurance system, two banks went
bankrupt: Amsterdam American Bank in 1981, and one of the mortgage banks (de
Tilburgsche Hypotheekbank) in 1982. Two other mortgage banks were rescued with
the help of insurance companies who took them over.52 The last bank to fail in the
Netherlands was the Amsterdam branch of bcci, in 1991. This implies that since the
introduction of the deposit insurance system, three banks have failed. No informa-
tion is available as to the amount of total and insured deposits at these institutions. 53
4.3  Factors influencing changes to the 1978 system
Over time, four factors, in particular, have influenced changes to the deposit insur-
ance system in the Netherlands since 1978. First, as shown above, discussions lead-
ing to the 1994 directive on deposit-guarantee schemes required deposit insurers in
many eu countries to make changes to their systems of deposit protection that har-
monised systems in the different member countries to a minimum extent and pro-
vided a more level playing field by limiting competition through deposit insurance
coverage. The second factor was a changing landscape of the financial markets in
Europe in general and in the Netherlands, in particular. Third, as described in Chap-
ter 3, the blurring of distinctions between different types of financial firms and the
increasingly complex design of financial instruments led the eu in 1997 to a second
eu directive on investor compensation schemes. The fourth factor is the reorganisa-
tion of Dutch supervisory agencies that took place in the second half of 2002. These
factors will be discussed below.
Harmonisation of regulation: the EU Directives of 1994 and 1997
As we have seen, the eu-Directive of May 1994 on deposit guarantee schemes estab-
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tries and temporarily precluded competition from branches of foreign banks that
offered higher coverage than their domestic competitors (‘the export prohibition’).
This directive led to the introduction of a revised scheme in the Netherlands in 1996,
although the authorising law was enacted earlier, in July 1995. The Netherlands did
not change its system of protection greatly. The deposit insurance system in opera-
tion in the Netherlands in 1996 is summarised in column 3 of Table 2 on page 46.
As mentioned above, the blurring of distinctions between financial firms and finan-
cial products caused the eu to decide that it had become difficult to separately iden-
tify deposits from other forms of consumer saving and that these other forms of sav-
ings warranted protection. This formed the third impetus to change in the
Netherlands and theeu. As described in chapter 2, the eu Parliament enacted a direc-
tive in 1997 on investor compensation schemes to provide protection to investors in
the securities markets. The 1997 directive led to a second, and more substantial, revi-
sion in the Dutch system of protection that took place in 1998. It caused not just the
revision of the deposit guarantee system for banks, but also the creation of a sepa-
rate system to protect investors in securities firms. A large percentage (approximate-
ly 80%) of securities business is conducted in the Netherlands by banks. Conse-
quently, to conform to the 1997 eu directive, the banks’ system of protection was
extended beyond deposits to encompass securities in what is called ‘the Collective
Guarantee Scheme of Credit Institutions for Repayable Funds and Portfolio Invest-
ments (cgs).’54 This enlarged scheme continued to be run by dnb. Protection for the
remaining 20% of the securities industry was attained in a separate schemeæthe
Investor Compensation Scheme (ics). The ics was operated by the Securities Board
of the Netherlands (later the Financial Markets Authority) from 1998 to 2002. In Sep-
tember 2002, as part of a major supervisory reorganisation described below, respon-
sibility for the ics was transferred to dnb. The major features of the cgs and the ics
are summarised in columns 4 and 5, respectively, of Table 2.
The Changing Financial Environment
Concentration has been an enduring factor in financial markets in the Netherlands.
Mergers between major banks have taken place since the 1960s and have led to a high-
ly concentrated banking sector. The percentage of banking assets held by the five largest
Dutch banks was 82% in 2000. This degree of concentration was much higher than the
European average of 55% in 1999 and more than four times that observed system-wide
in Germany.55 The cumulative distribution of asset holdings in the year 2000 is shown
in Chart 3, which emphasises the dominance of the three largest banks. 
Since the late 1980s the financial sector in the Netherlands has changed considerably.
Deregulation56, financial engineering,globalisation; conglomeration; the blurring of
distinctions between banking, insurance, and securities activities; theeu´s single mar-
ket for financial services; the creation of the euro; and growing recognition of the
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markets world-wide. These developments caused changes in supervisory law and
practice in the Netherlands and revisions in its system of deposit protection. 
Chart 2 in chapter 2 illustrates the trend of internationalisation and financial con-
glomeration in a number ofeu-countries. Chart 4 does the same for the Netherlands.
It shows that the number of deals consummated within the Netherlands during the
1990s within the same segment of the financial sector was particularly high in the first
half of the decade. In the second half of the 1990s, the number of cross-border deals
within the same segment of the industry became prominent.
Changing Supervisory Structures
Major changes in the structure and market composition of the financial sector have
necessitated compensating changes in the institutional framework of financial super-
vision systems and a revision of supervisory practices in the Netherlands.57 Initially,
supervision in many countries, including the Netherlands, was applied separately to
commercial banks, insurance companies and securities firms. To a considerable
extent such sectoral supervision continues to be practised in the United States, where
legislation for many years separated commercial from investment banking and con-
tinues to isolate banking from commerce. But such a separate-industry model was
never particularly appropriate in many of the financial markets in Europe, where uni-
versal banking has frequently prevailed. As discussed in Section 2 above, in some
countries, such as the United Kingdom, the growth of financial conglomerates has
39
Depositor and investor protection in The Netherlands: past, present and future













Chart 3  Bank concentration in the Netherlands. Assets of individual banks as
percentage of total assets (cumulative), 2000led to the creation of a single supervisor that oversees all three segments of the finan-
cial markets.58
Conglomerates evolved over time in the Netherlands, as Figure 4 illustrates. During
the 1980s, for example, banks in the Netherlands increasingly undertook securities
activities. Further, following the removal, in 1990, of a prohibition on combining
banking and insurance activities in the Netherlands, mergers and acquisitions among
financial firms from different industry segments lead to the creation of conglomer-
ates in the local market. 
Nevertheless, the separate-industry model of supervision continued to dominate the
supervisory scene in the Netherlands until the 1990s. De Nederlandsche Bank (dnb)
was responsible for systemic stability and it also supervised individual banks, mon-
ey exchange offices and collective investment schemes with regard to their safety and
soundness and their conduct of business. The Bank also ran the cgs. The Pensions
and Insurance Authority oversaw pensions and insurance companies, and the Secu-
rities Board guided securities firms and the exchanges and ran the ics.59 This appor-
tionment of responsibilities is illustrated in the boxes in Figure 5. 
40 Occasional Studies 2.2
   
 
      
 
   







  Within border, 
  within industry
  Within border, 
  cross industry
  Cross border, 
  within industry
 
  Cross border,
  cross industry
Source:  Constructed by the authors from g10 data (2000).
Chart 4  Financial consolidation in the Netherlands: number of deals in the
financial sector (mergers and take-overs) classified by acquiring firmDuring the 1990s, however, the changed financial landscape increasingly pointed to
the need for a revision of regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. For example,
the development of bancassurance in the Netherlands has lead to increasing co-oper-
ation by the bank and insurance supervisors. To complete this process , legislation
has been proposed to unify the two supervisors as soon as possible. Thus, supervi-
sory structures have changed in recognition that technological change has facilitat-
ed the blurring of banking, insurance, and securities markets. In 1999, a Council was
established to co-ordinate the supervision of the three components of the financial
services industry. In 2002, a major reorganisation was accomplished. Supervision
would no longer be conducted by industry, but rather on a cross-sectoral basis with
emphasis on (1) systemic stability, (2) the soundness of individual financial institu-
tions, and (3) the proper conduct of business.
The responsibilities for these three functions are now apportioned as follows. The
Bank retains responsibility for systemic stability and prudential supervision of cred-
it institutions. It co-operates closely with the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory
Authority to undertake the prudential supervision of insurance companies. As men-
tioned above, these two supervisors are expected to be fully integrated no later than
January 1, 2005. The Bank took over from the Authority for Financial Markets the
prudential oversight of securities firms. It continues to operate the cgs and has
acquired responsibility for the ics. 
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Chart 5  Reallocating Supervisory Responsibilities in the Netherlands: 
The Institutional Design of Financial Supervision Before and after 2002The Securities Market Supervisor changed its name to the Authority for Financial
Markets and has taken responsibility for conduct-of-business supervision for all
financial firms. The Council of Financial Supervisors, created in 1999 to co-ordinate
regulation across the different industry supervisors, remains in operation after the
2002 reorganisation to facilitate supervisory co-operation. A Covenant between the
three supervisors sets the ‘rules of the game.’ The reallocated responsibilities are illus-
trated in the circles and ovals in Chart 5.
4.4  Depositor and investor protection in 2003
This section describes the cgs and ics that are in place in the Netherlands in detail.
It focuses on membership, funding, charges, governance, coverage, provisions for
repayment and public relations.60
Membership
Membership in the systems of protection for both depositors and for investors is
compulsory for credit institutions and for securities firms.61 In both systems, branch-
es of banks or securities firms that operate in the Netherlands, but have their head-
quarters in other eu countries, are covered by the protection scheme available in
their home country. The eu directive requires that such banks or securities firms be
allowed to ‘top up’ the cover they offer by joining the scheme in the Netherlands if
it offers additional coverage. Although the Netherlands restricted the implementa-
tion of the eu Directive to the minimum level required in that Directive, it has made
bilateral agreements with certain countries to permit topping up.62 Similarly, for
both schemes, Dutch banks or securities firms cover the deposits and/or securities
when they operate in countries in the European Economic Area (eea). 
Funding 
The funding systems of the cgs and the ics differ. There is no fund for the cgs. To
avoid a delay in payment, dnb advances funds to insured depositors and then asks
member banks to repay the (interest-free) loan. After having made a first estimate of
the insured deposits at the failed institution, dnb calls upon surviving member insti-
tutions to cover the estimated costs. These immediate charges are provisional and
have in practice thus far been based on total deposits. Second, as regards the final
settlement, which will be arranged after the liquidation has been settled, dnb leaves
it to the representatives of the banking sector to agree upon the final basis for the ex
post assessments. Hence shares are determined, case-by-case, by agreement among
the representative institutions. If the representative institutions cannot agree, dnb
would make the apportionment. 
The ics maintains a fund of eur11.3 million for compensating investors. This fund
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Contributions to this fund were drawn from securities firms, which have also agreed
to provide, ex post, a second tranche of eur11.3 million in case the fund is not suffi-
cient to cover the expenses. The banking industry together with the securities firms
will, ex post, provide any additional sum in case the first two tranches are not suffi-
cient in a particular case. Note that the banks do not benefit directly from the ics,
as investor claims against failed banks are paid under the cgs. 
It is clear that there is some room for improvement in removing ambiguities in
the current funding arrangements. Already the cgs covers both the banking and
securities businesses undertaken by banks. But no bank has failed since 1991; conse-
quently, the cgs has not yet faced the difficult decision of how to apportion ex post
assessments among surviving institutions that have both banking and securities com-
ponents. It is not clear how the representative trade associations responsible for the
apportionment would react if a bank failed. Moreover, the Decree of 28 September
1998 is open to different interpretations. For example, Section 12.1 reads, 
‘the Bank, after consulting the representative organizations, shall fix the appor-
tionment percentage, determining in addition, with due observance of 2(4),
whether this shall involve one apportionment percentage for all compensa-
tions or two apportionment percentages, one for the compensations to credi-
tors and one for the compensations to investors.’ 
Section 12.2 continues, 
‘The apportionment percentage for each participating institution shall be
established on the basis of the data in consolidated prudential balance sheets
provided to the Bank by participating institutions prior to the time of the deci-
sion as defined in section 3(1). In consultation with the representative organi-
zations, the Bank shall also decide which consolidated prudential balance sheet
items shall be used and which items in these balance sheets shall be included
in this calculation, which is conducted by dividing the aggregate amount of
these items of all participating institutions and multiplying the outcome by
one hundred percent.  Data from the insolvent institution shall not be includ-
ed. The calculation may be conducted for the covered claims of investors and
creditors either separately or collectively.’
The wording quoted above leaves room for different approaches to setting protec-
tion charges for the deposit insurance system. It does, not, for example, preclude
making assessments that are adjusted for the risk that an institution poses to the fund.
Stronger member institutions can be expected to favor risk-adjusting charges
whether they be imposed ex ante or ex post.
For both the cgs and the ics, there is an annual limit of 5% of own funds on the
total amount that can be collected from the industry in any year and a similar limit
of 5% of own funds on that that can be contributed by any individual bank or secu-
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tor free of interest charges. dnb has, in the past, used its seigniorage revenues to cov-
er the costs of bank supervision and administering the cgs and has, therefore, not
imposed charges on credit institutions for these services. Some would see this as an
additional subsidy to the industry. The Netherlands Securities Board on the other
hand, which until 2003 was responsible for the carrying out of the ics, does charge
the supervised institutions for its services. 
The new institutional design of financial supervision in the Netherlands in 2002 has
triggered a debate about covering the cost of financial supervision. This has result-
ed in changes to the system of financing of financial supervision. In the new system,
banks contribute to the cost of supervision.
Premiums
Although the bases for imposing charges on member institutions differ between the
cgs and ics, neither scheme currently adjusts the charges it imposes for the risk that
a member poses to the scheme. Securities firms make a uniform fixed payment to
the ics and a variable payment of eur5.8 per client. There is a similar annual limit of
5% of own funds on the total amount that can be collected from the industry in any
year and a similar limit of 5% of own funds on that that can be contributed by any
individual bank or securities firm. Any excess over these limits will be provided by
the Bank free of interest charges.
Governance
Statute decrees that the Ministry of Finance designate certain trade associations to
represent their members in cooperating with dnbin running the protection schemes.
For the cgs, the credit institutions are represented by the Banker’s Association.63 For
the ics, the Ministry of Finance has designated both the Bankers’ Association and
the representative organizations of the brokers, the securities dealers and financial
advisers. This statutory obligation for the implementers of the protection schemes
to consult and cooperate with the member organizations reflects the culture of con-
sensus, which is characteristic of the Netherlands.64
Coverage 
The eu directives attempt to provide parity in minimum coverage for depositors and
investors. The Netherlands has adopted the eur20,000 minimum coverage under
the ics, as well as the cgs. Deposits and investments held at credit institutions of per-
sons, foundations, associations, and small enterprises are each covered to eur20,000.
The limit applies separately to deposits and investments.65 It applies to the sum of a
person’s holdings, including those held in joint accounts, at any failed bank or secu-
rities firm. In accordance with the eu Directive mandatory exclusions, the member’s
own funds, those of other credit institutions, and money-laundered funds are exclud-
ed from coverage. The Netherlands has adopted the eu Directive’s list of optional
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schemes, the deposits/investments of banks, insurance companies, pension funds,
government bodies, insiders, and money launderers are excluded from coverage. 
Provisions for Repayment
The cgs guarantee comes into effect when the Bank determines that a credit insti-
tution cannot repay its deposits or fulfill its obligations to investors and will not be
in a position to do so in the near future. At this point, the Bank issues notification
that requests for compensation may be submitted. The depositor’s/investor’s claim
against the failed bank is set off against the bank’s claims against the customer. Fear
of illiquidity might be a strong motivation to run for those depositors that have both
their loan (a mortgage for example) and their deposit at the same bank. Some ana-
lysts point out that offsetting both loans that are current and loans that are in arrears
could threaten the viability of sound borrowers who are unable to refinance their
loans elsewhere. Better practice would be to offset only loans that are due or that are
not current. This avoids unfairly penalizing good borrowers (with adverse macro-
economic consequences) especially as it is typically easier to borrow from a bank that
keeps one’s deposit. Offsetting is common practice in depositor protection schemes
around the world, however.  To aid depositors in failed banks to submit claims tele-
phone numbers, a mail address and e-mail address are supplied for an applicant to
request further information. The speed of payment is not fast, namely 3 months after
a claim is filed. This period can be extended for another 3 months, however, if the
implementer is of the opinion that the claimant has provided insufficient informa-
tion to support his claim.66
The procedures for repaying investors under the ics when a securities firm fails have
changed because of the transfer from the Securities Board to dnb. Claimants will
submit their claims to or obtain necessary information from dnb. The speed of pay-
ment is similar to that in the cgs, namely 3 months after a claim is filed. As in the
cgs, this period can be extended for another 3 months.
Public Relations 
As discussed above, there may be different objectives behind protecting depositors
and investors. In the 1994 eu Directive, deposit insurance has two stated goalsæto
promote financial stability by discouraging bank runs that can spread and lead to
financial crisis, and to provide protection for the small depositor. As envisaged in
the eu 1997 Directive, protection for small investors is principally an element of con-
sumer protection, which is but a secondary consideration for many countries offer-
ing deposit insurance. With regard to public relations, dnb maintains a web site for
those covered by the cgs and provides a brochure explaining coverage. Now that
dnbhas responsibility for the icsas well, similar resources are made available to secu-
rities investors. In conformance with the spirit of the eu Directives, insured mem-
bers in the Netherlands are not allowed to use the protection schemes as a market-
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Table 2  Systems of Protection for Depositors and Investors in the
Netherlands
Feature 1978 1996 to 1998 cgs (1998 to 2003) ics (1998 to 2003)*
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sary information to customers.
The characteristics of the cgs and ics from 1978 through 2003 are given in Table 2  
4.5  Assessment
Systems of protection need to adopt certain characteristics and to eschew certain
other practices, in order to avoid moral hazard, adverse selection, and agency prob-
lems and to maintain financial integrity and public confidence.67 This section assess-
es the systems of depositor and investor protection in place in the Netherlands
against internationally accepted good standards. 
Deposit insurance practitioners and most economists advise that a deposit insurance
system should be designed to minimize moral hazard, adverse selection and agency
problems.68 They therefore recommend that the system be:
1) Clearly laid out in law and regulation;
2) Compulsory;
3) Offer limited coverage so that sophisticated customers can exercise market disci-
pline;
4) Adequately funded to maintain public confidence;
5) Risk-based in the premiums it charges;
6) Backed by government funding in the event of a systemic crisis;
7) Publicly run where public funds are at risk, but advised by the private sector;
8) Accountable but free from unreasonable political interference; and
9) Understood by member institutions and the public.
Table 3 lists the recommended practices and indicates whether they are followed by
the protection schemes that are currently in operation in the Netherlands and that
were described in the previous section. From Table 3 the following conclusions can
be drawn. In conformance with good practice, the systems of protection have real-
istic objectives, operate in a good legal, financial, and political environment, are
47
Depositor and investor protection in The Netherlands: past, present and future
* In 2003, the ics was transferred to dnb. The columns describe the system as it was before this transfer.  
Sources:  dnb archives, dnb 2000a, 2000b, 2000c
Feature 1978 1996 to 1998 cgs (1998 to 2003) ics (1998 to 2003)*
Public Relations








By implementer Brochure, help
desk, web site for
dnb
Upon request 
(not allowed to 
use it as 
marketing tool)
Help desk and website of the
Securities BoardThought needs to be given on ways
to accelerate payments.
Occasional Studies 2.2
Issue Good Practice Practice in the Netherlands  Possible Improvements
Infrastructure Have realistic objectives Goals are set by the eu Directives as consumer
protection and fair competition within the eu.
High concentration is a binding
constraint on system objectives.
Define mandate
carefully
The mandate is a narrow one; to compensate those
guaranteed.
Countries with a broad mandate can
pay out more quickly
Sound legal, judicial,
accounting, financial,
& political institutions 
The country is mature and its institutions are sound.
Moral 
hazard
Explicitly define  System is defined in law and regulation Certain aspects need clarification
Strong supervision Is in place
Resolve failed
institutions promptly
Bank failures are very rare. Closure has been prompt, but
liquidation is slow
Offer low coverage Yes: Has adopted the eu’s minimum coverage level of
eur20,000 to allow sophisticated creditors to exercise
market discipline.
Offset loans due or in
default against deposits
All loans are offset. Offsetting good loans can bankrupt





The cgs is compulsory for credit institutions and ics
for investment firms that deal with the public.
Charge premiums
adjusted for risk
Neither the cgs nor the ics risk adjusts its charges to
reflect the actuarially fair cost of providing coverage
to individual institutions.
Risk adjusting premiums (easier in a
funded system) would be financially






Both the cgs and the ics are run by dnb.   Within the new legislation, lines of
accountability are expected to be
clarified and strengthened.
Confine the representa-
tives of member institu-
tions to an advisory role
The current law gives trade associations a significant
role. 
The Ministry of Finance will enact




and the lender of last
resort.
dnb has responsibility for all of these functions. Ensure that legislation clearly defines




Be well-funded There is no cgs fund. The ambiguity in the responsibility
for sharing ex post funding costs in




Data on condition are good but it is not clear whether
they are used for insurance purposes. Information on
insured deposits is not available.
Members need to be required to
report data on insured deposits.
Make members respon-
sible for financing the
scheme in normal times
This is recommended in the eu Directives and is
followed mostly in the Netherlands. However, dnb
provides some implicit subsidies. Banks are going to
cont to supervision cost, however.
The implicit subsidies need to be
recognized and removed.
Have financial backing
from the government in
a severe crisis
The eu Directives place no responsibility on
governments to support their guarantee systems. The
Netherlands government does not provide it, but dnb
might well do so.
dnb and the Ministry of Finance
should establish, ahead of time,
contingency plans to deal with any
crisis that might arise.
Pay out or transfer
deposits and investments
quickly.
By adhering to the eu’s lengthy payout standards,
local practice fails to meet this goal.
Inform the public Everyone involved needs to know the characteristics
of the guarantee in order to adapt his behavior and
protect his  interests.
It is recognized that public relations
need to be improved. New publicity
campain will start in 2005.
Table 3  Practices in the Netherlands and Possible Improvements to Contain
the Pitfalls of Guarantees
Source:  Adapted from Garcia (2000, Table 1).compulsory, have strong supervisory systems, are defined in law and regulation, and
offer low coverage. However, there are divergences from good practice in that there
is no deposit insurance fund, premiums are not adjusted for risk, there is no finan-
cial backing from the government, and the arrangements for members to share costs
are unclear. Further, the threat of closure is not effective for large banks, the systems’
obligations to customers are not known because there is no measure of insured
funds, and the repayment process is slow as compared to that in the us, although it
obeys eu regulation. Also, all loans from depositors are offset, which may create liq-
uidity problems for depositors and makes the system potentially vulnerable to runs.
Finally, improvements could be made in governance structures, accountability, and
public relations. Also, a question can legitimately be raised whether providing a
deposit insurance subsidy in the form of interest-free financing complies with the eu
Directive’s admonition that ‘the cost of financing such schemes must be borne, in
principle, by credit institutions themselves.’ It might be preferable for the deposit
insurer to build an ex ante fund to provide the funds with which to compensate the
depositors of failed banks in a timely manner. Alternatively, it could charge banks a
fair interest rate on any loans it makes. The current changes to the system of financ-
ing of financial supervision, with banks that in the near future will contribute to the
cost of supervision by dnb, may provide the opportunity to take this possibility into
account.
The changing financial landscape may further prompt a debate about changes to the
protection schemes. Since 1992, in the eu the so-called ‘single passport’ applies to
banks. This implies that an institution that has obtained a license to act as a bank in
one of the member countries is automatically licensed to operate as a bank in all oth-
er member countries. Branches of foreign eu-banks operating in the Netherlands are
covered by the protection scheme in their home country. In recent years, foreign
bank branches and subsidiaries have come not just from eu countries, but also from
non-eu countries. In the latter case, they have obtained a license to act as banks not
automatically, but as a result of an explicit approval by dnb. They are required to
offer protection to depositors and investors in the Netherlands and hence to take
part in the cgs and ics. Concerns have been raised that some of these banks may
have riskier profiles than domestic banks in the Netherlands. They collect deposits
in the Netherlands and on-lend them to their emerging-market home countries.
These banks have joined the Netherlands’ system of deposit insurance. In this way,
they may be able to overcome their initial disadvantage of being relatively unknown
in the Netherlands in order to gain market share in the Dutch financial system.
Moreover, given the process of further economic integration in Europe, it cannot be
ruled out that banks from countries that joined the eu in May 2004 will establish
branches and subsidiaries in member countries, including the Netherlands.  There
have been virtually no bank failures in the Netherlands in recent years so that ques-
tions concerning deposit insurance have been moot. But the situation could change
with the advent of new competitors. The resulting potential for additional failures
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in the Netherlands. 
4.6  Conclusion
In accordance with eu-directives, the Netherlands has systems of protection in place
for both depositors and investors. This chapter has studied these systems and con-
cludes that in a number of aspects, the systems conform to the good practices advo-
cated in the literature. The schemes operate under a good legal, financial and polit-
ical environment, have realistic objectives, are compulsory, defined in law and
regulation, and offer limited coverage. However, there are also some divergences
from good practice. There is no deposit insurance fund, premiums are not risk-
adjusted, there is no financial backing from the government, and the arrangements
for members to share costs are unclear. Further, the threat of closure is not effective
for large banks, the systems’ obligations to customers are not known because there
is no measure of insured funds, the repayment process and final settlement are slow
and all loans are offset. Finally, improvements could be made in governance struc-
tures, accountability, and public relations. The next chapter will concentrate in
detail on these potential changes.
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Protection in the Netherlands
5.1  Introduction
Based on the assessment in the previous chapter and the suggested potential changes
with regard to funding, ownership, governance and public relations of the protec-
tion systems in place in the Netherlands early in 2003, this chapter discusses a num-
ber of strategic decisions to be made when deciding on these changes. It is structured
as follows. Decisions on fund size and premiums will be discussed in section 5.2. Sec-
tion 5.3. looks at possible improvements in governance and accountability. Relations
with the public will be touched upon in section 5.4.69 In separate boxes, the paper
discusses the integration of the deposit insurance scheme and the investor compen-
sation scheme in the Netherlands andthe pros and cons of expanding financial guar-
antees to insurance and pension claims. Section 5.5 summarizes the chapter. 
5.2  Issues relating to funding the guarantees
5.2.1  Introduction
The most difficult decisions that need to be made concern the funding for the
scheme. Four important issues need to be resolved: (1) whether to meet funding
needs with flat rate or risk-based assessments, (2) whether to levy charges ex post or
in anticipation of needs, (3) the size of the fund and (4) the base on which to make
assessments. These issues will be discussed in this section. It should be kept in mind
that these issues are intertwined. For example, fund size is a relevant issue only if a
choice is made in favour of ex ante funding. Moreover, the target fund size may
depend on the incentive structure that is chosen. Thus, the optimal fund size may
be the outcome of a bottom-up procedure, with credit risk modeling used to esti-
mate the risks for individual members and the optimal premium structure, and
aggregation resulting in the optimal fund size. In that case, there is a direct relation-
ship between premiums and fund size. Alternatively, the procedure may be top-
down, with aggregate fund size and premium structure determined separately. More-
over, the ownership structure of the protection schemes may also have implications
for their funding. 
As a background to the discussion about the choices to be made in the Netherlands,
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usand Canada.  The picture thatemergesfrom Table 4 is that 15 out of these 20 devel-
oped countries have a funded system (ex ante financing), and from these 15 coun-
tries, 9 adjust deposit insurance premiums to risk. Italy is an example of a country
where the fund is limited to cover expected administrative expenses, but with ex post
financing through risk adjusted premiums. The countries with risk-adjusted ex ante
funding are those that either have witnessed serious banking crises, or that were rel-
atively late in establishing deposit insurance, for example to comply with eu-regula-
tion. The Netherlands is an example of an eu-country that was early in introducing
deposit insurance, and has not had serious banking problems. This may explain why
the deposit insurance system in the Netherlands has many characteristics that date
back to its initial establishment in 1978. Table 4 also gives the degree of bank con-
centration, measured as the assets of the five largest institutions as a percentage of
total bank assets (for the us and Canada: deposits instead of assets). As will be
explained below, the degree of concentration may be a relevant variable when it
comes to establishing the fund size and premiums. However, as can be seen from
Table 4, there does not seem to be a clear-cut picture when it comes to fund char-
acteristics (funding, fund size or target, on the one hand, and bank concentration on
the other). Thus, the degree of concentration of countries with a funded system
ranges from 19% in Germany to 88% in Sweden. It is on average (not corrected for
country size) 59%. In countries with ex post financing, the degree of concentration
varies from 26% in Luxembourg to 98% in Liechtenstein and is on average 62%. Like-
wise, there does not seem to be a clear correlation between fund size or target on the
one hand and the degree of concentration on the other. However, targets might be
expected to be higher in weaker systems or where there the guarantor has recently
had to payout substantial claims. In fact, Table 4 shows that targets range from a low
of 0.2% of insured deposits in Ireland, which has had no recent history of bank prob-
lems, to 2.5% in Sweden, which suffered a severe banking crisis in the early 1990s. It
also shows that countries that do not maintain a fund have flat-rate rather than risk-
adjusted premiums.
5.2.2  Ex Ante and Ex Post Funding: a Comparison
An important funding decision is whether to assess banks after or before failures
occur. An ex post assessment system is subject to four criticisms. First, it precludes
penalizing the riskiest institutionæfor the risk it has already imposed. Consequent-
ly, it is unfair in that an institution that fails provides no resources to compensate its
depositors. Compensation is provided by its safer, surviving peers. Second, it does
not offer good incentives for avoiding unreasonable risk because it makes charges
uncertain and discourages risk-adjustment. Third, ex post funding can be economi-
cally sub-optimal in its timing. Banks typically fail when the economy is weak. An
ex post funding system places all of the compensation demands on surviving banks
52 Occasional Studies 2.2at a time when they are already likely to be under stress. Such a pro-cyclical funding
arrangement could, conceptually, weaken the banking system at a time of crisis. It
would be better, it is argued, to build up fund during good times and deplete it in
bad times. In this case, the fund acts as an automatic stabilizer for the macro econ-
omy.70 Fourth, ex post funding means either that insured depositors have to wait to
be compensated until surviving members supply the necessary funds, or the guar-
antor has to borrow to meet its needs, which may be difficult or more costly in the
absence of government assistance.
Funded systems have a number of advantages. First, they ensure that an institution
that fails has contributed to the fund that will compensate its depositors. Second,
they reduce the cross subsidization of weak institutions by their stronger peers.
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Table 4 Funding Approaches and Targets
A  Systems with a fund
Country Fund target Premiums: Degree of bank
F = flat rate concentrationa)
R= risk adjusted
Belgium 0,5% of insured deposits F 76
Denmark 1% of insured deposits F 77
Finland 2% of insured deposits R 86
France eur 500 million R 43
Germany  R 19
(Public Scheme) 3% of loans
(Private Scheme) ‘A reasonable level’
Greece ‘A reasonable level’ F 84
Iceland 1% of deposits F 82
Ireland 0.2% of insured deposits F 41
Italy Estimated operation costs for the year R 26
Norway 1.5% of deposits plus 
0.5% of risk-adjusted assets R 68
Portugal No target R 44
Spain 1% of insured deposits F 52
Sweden 2.5% of deposits R 88
United Kingdom Estimated needs for the year F 29
United States 1.25% of estimated insured deposits R 27
Canada No target R 77
B. Systems with ex post charging






a  Assets of five largest banks as a percentage of total bank assets; for the us and Canada: deposits instead of assets.      
Sources:  Garcia (2000, 2002); Maxwell Stamp (2001); Pistelli (1999); ecb, bis, imf, oecd, Bankscope.Third, a fund facilitates charging risk-adjusting premiums that counter adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard. Fourth, the fund can be seen as an automatic macroeco-
nomic stabilizer. Fifth, to assure public confidence, a protection scheme needs to be
well funded. While this goal can be met in an ex post scheme, it is easier to achieve
where there is a guarantee fund. Sixth, maintaining a large fund reduces pressure on
the government to supplement fund resources in recessions when bankers can justi-
fiably claim that paying heavy additional charges to compensate the depositors in
failed banks will prejudice their own continued viability. Seventh, compensation can
be paid more quickly.  In short, maintaining a fund can be fairer to member insti-
tutions, speed payouts, increase public confidence, and facilitate macroeconomic
policy. 
Still, one could argue that there are some drawbacks. These have to do with effi-
ciency in relation to the stability of the financial sector. First, a fund needs to be
managed and this involves costs, which have to be weighed against the benefits. A
well-managed fund may facilitate the procedure of payment to depositors in case
a bank has failed. In countries with many failures this advantage may outweigh the
management costs. But if bank failures are very rare, the management costs are like-
ly to be quite large in relation to the efficiency gain in case of bank failures. Sec-
ond, the fund assets should be low-risk and have high liquidity. They will there-
fore earn a relatively low return and banks may argue that they would have made
a more profitable investment of the premiums paid. However, a credible deposit
insurance system requires that, in the absence of a fund, banks keep aside liquid
assets for the purpose of ex post financing. If banks believe that the likelihood of
bank failures is extremely low, they will argue that the fund size is too high and/or
that management costs are too high relative to the expected layouts. This is most
likely to be the case in countries with a stable banking sector and/or banks that are
either too big to fail or are government-owned. 71 These considerations are lead-
ing countries to combine ex ante and ex post funding in order to obtain the advan-
tages of both approaches.
As Table 4 shows, all of the systems that risk-adjust premiums maintain a deposit
insurance fund, although the fund size is in some cases, Italy for example, limited in
size and merely meant to cover administrative expenses.72 Several countries have
shifted from a system of ex post funding in recent years to an at least partially fund-
ed system to facilitate their adoption of risk-based pricing, which may facilitate risk-
based pricing. It is believed that, in order to obtain the full benefits of risk-adjusted
pricing, member institutions need to know in advance what they will be charged for
the risks they take. Such knowledge will allow them to adjust their operations so that
they do not take risks for which they are unwilling to pay. 
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With regard to funding needs and premiums, those responsible for designing and
operating systems of deposit insurance have become increasingly aware of the dan-
gers of moral hazard, adverse selection and agency problems. This has led to efforts
to design a pricing scheme for deposit insurance that minimizes these problems by
providing an incentive structure that counters the temptation, inherent in an under-
priced guarantee, for institutions to take excessive risks. The system of ex post assess-
ment that is in place in the Netherlands does not adjust for risk. Also, the rules
regarding assessments are unclear. Good practice requires premiums that reflect the
actuarially fair cost of providing coverage to individual institutions.
The problem with opting for a risk-adjusted premium structure is a practical oneæ-
choosing a schedule of charges that reflects the risk that each institution poses to the
fund without further weakening, even bankrupting, institutions that are already
weak. There are issues of fairness and efficiency/effectiveness to be considered. If
premiums are set so as to influence the behaviour of member institutions, these insti-
tutions need to know the exact basis for the charges that will be imposed so that they
can estimate them accurately. Only in this way can they adjust their operations
accordingly and eschew risks they are unwilling to fund. As discussed in Garcia and
Prast (2003b), the current ambiguous ex post arrangements in the Netherlands do not
meet this transparency test. Further, the lack of transparency is counter-productive.
The purpose of establishing a risk-adjusted scheme is to charge banks with unduly
risky operations for the likely costs to the fund of their activities. The intention is
that correct pricing will curb excessive risk-taking.  
While the merit of the intention of risk-based pricing is evident, its practicality is sub-
ject to challenge. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) develop a theoretical model
where asymmetric information makes fairly priced deposit insurance impossible.
Freixas and Rochet (1995) present a model where fairly priced insurance is feasible but
may not be desirable from a welfare point of view, as it triggers a trade off between sta-
tic and dynamic efficiency. Nevertheless, a number of countries around the world have
been attracted to the idea of risk-adjusted deposit insurance charges during the past
decade. As Table 4 above has shown, 7 countries in the eea, the us and Canada adjust
premiums to risk. Worldwide, at latest count, 25 countries, approximately one-third of
those with explicit systems of deposit protection, risk-adjusted their charges in 2001.73
The approaches used for setting the charges varied from the simplest approach, used
in Norway and Poland, of basing assessments on risk-adjusted assets as measured
under the Basle capital requirements, to more complex arrangements. Some meth-
ods of adjustment are inexplicit, with the regulation merely remarking that the
charges reflect the judgment of the supervisory agency (Croatia, Mexico, and Peru).
Other adjustment systems are simple and explicit, being based on quantitative cri-
teria, such as capital adequacy (Finland, Hungary, Sweden, and Turkey). 
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to set prices for deposit insurance and targets for the fund. The assumption, which
is questionable, is that history will be a good guide to the future. Forward-looking
models use one of several other approaches, especially ones that focus on volatility
and covariance, in order to anticipate the risks that members will impose on their
fund in the future and the premiums that will be necessary to cover these risks. Both
backward- and forward-looking models can construct their estimates from the bot-
tom up or from the top down.74
In the bottom-up approach, a fair premium should adequately compensate the guar-
antor during a specific time period, such as one year. It is determined and levied on
each individual institution. The system’s total need for funds during this period is
estimated as the sum of the individual premiums. Estimating funding needs from
the bottom up is feasible in countries that do not have a very large number of insti-
tutions. For example, it would not be feasible for the 8,000 members of the u.s. Bank
Insurance Fund (bif). In a system with a very large number of members, the funds
that a system will need during any period can be estimated top down and aggregate
needs are shared amongst member institutions in proportion to their deposits or
according to their risk classifications. Aggregate funding needs can be estimated (1)
judgmentally from the fund historical experience as to what has proved to be ade-
quate in past, from (2) the insurer’s own past loss distribution, (3) the insurer’s cred-
it risk model, (4) the cost of obtaining private reinsurance for part of the insurer’s
portfolio, (5) simulations, or (6) information derived from capital notes, issued by
the insurer, whose payments would be contingent on the state of the insurance
fund.75Some bottom-up and top-down approaches using backward- or forward-look-
ing data are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Approaches to Forecasting Funding Needs
Outlook Bottom Up Top Down
Backward- Supervisory data Fund history
Looking Credit scores Insurer’s past loss 
Loss distributions for individual members distribution
Forward-  Option pricing for individual members  Private reinsurance for fund
Looking Credit risk models for individual members Insurer’s Credit Risk Model
Individual credit ratings,  Simulations
Market prices for individualmembers Capital notes
Volatility of individual income statements 
Source:  Authors’ analysis.57
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Box 1  Option Pricing
When the deposit insurer guarantees deposits, it takes on a contingent claim. The
value of this claim can be estimated from a functional relationship based on a num-
ber of assumptions regarding the behavior of the function’s arguments.76  The result-
ing estimation process can be complex. In the 1970s, however, academics observed
that deposit insurance was isomorphic to a European put option written on a bank’s
assets and they applied the Black-Scholes option-pricing model to simplify the
process of finding actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums for individual banks.
The model’s aim is to use market data to estimate the value, during a specified time
period, of the choice (a put option) that a bank has to turn over (‘put’) its assets and
liabilities to the insurance agency when its asset values have declined sufficiently so
that the supervisor revokes the bank’s license.  In the Black-Scholes model, the value
of the guarantee is a decreasing function of the bank’s asset-to-liability ratio and an
increasing function of the volatility of asset returns.77
However, it was later recognized that the Black-Scholes approach was flawed
because it made inappropriate assumptions. For example, the model assumes nor-
mally distributed asset returns.78 As observed below, the normality assumption is
unrealistic and systematically underestimates probabilities of default. Moreover,
the inappropriate assumptions resulted in mis-pricing of far-out-of-the-money
and deep-in-the money options.79
At the cost of additional computational complexity, some economists have cho-
sen not to make Black-Scholes’ simplifying assumptions.80 While traders have
now adjusted the Black-Scholes model to correct the mis-pricing, the adjustment
would seem to be too ad hoc to be useful for evaluating fair insurance premiums,81
and no consensus has evolved in favor of applying option pricing models in the
real world of deposit insurance. Moreover, the authors are not aware of any coun-
try that is attempting to use this approach, possibly because of its theoretical and
practical problems.82
Others, wanting to use market information to help assess bank risk, have used data
on an individual institution’s uninsured deposits, senior debentures, subordinat-
ed debt, interest rate swaps, credit derivatives, equity prices, charges for privately
provided insurance, and credit ratings by rating agencies to supplement supervi-
sory data in estimating the probability of failure. The institution’s business mix,
its loan concentration, and the structure of its liabilities can also be expected to
affect the severity of the insurer’s loss. There is also a model where the value of
the guarantee/fair premium can be determined as a function of the spread
between rates paid on insured and uninsured deposits in a system where banks
can offer unlimited amounts of both insured deposits that pay a low rate and
uninsured deposits that pay a higher rate.83 The fair price would be determined by
simulation exercises, recognizing default risk, to ensure adequate funding..There are a number of approaches to estimating fair premiums, but the authors are
not aware of any method that is ideal from both theoretical and practical perspec-
tives. Box 1 describes the Black-Scholes method of option pricing. That method
might (or might not) result in actuarially fair deposit premiums, but may be too com-
plex to be used in practice for regulatory purposes.
Some countries (including Finland and Sweden) tie premiums to the bank’s capital
adequacy. Another simple approach is to rely on supervisory data to estimate the
probability of failure for each individual institution and its likely cost to the guar-
antor should the member default. The advantage of this approach is that superviso-
ry data are readily available in developed countries in the form of camels, or similar
ratings.84 A disadvantage is that supervisory assessments are judgmental, so that their
use for setting insurance charges might prove controversial. Nevertheless, several
countries in Latin America rely solely on supervisory ratings when setting fair pre-
miums for individual institutions.
Several countries use qualitative supervisory data in conjunction with quantitative
measures, particularly capital adequacy. In the United States, for example, the 8,000
banks are divided into 9 groups according to their capital adequacy and camels rat-
ings.85 (See Table 6.) Possibly this approach is the best available from both a theo-
retical and practical perspective, because it relies on the observation, made above,
that the guarantor can rely on monitoring, capital adequacy, asset restrictions, in
addition to risk-based pricing in order to protect itself from the adverse selection and
moral hazard inherent in the guarantee business.86 In addition, it is probably not a
design accident that the us system is transparent to each individual member but not
to its competitors or to the general public. It is necessary not to so alarm the public
about an individual institution’s weakness that it leads to runs.
A number of countries (including Canada, France, Italy, and Portugal) use an elab-
oration of this simple, two-factor, approach.  The Canada Deposit Insurance System
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Table 6 bif’s Current Assessment Schedule
In basis points
Capital Group/  a  Best Rated b  Middle Rated c  Lowest Rated
Supervisory Rating (camels 1 and 2) (camel 3) (camels 4 and 5)
Well capitalized 03 1 7
Adequately capitalized 31 02 4
Undercapitalized 10 24 27
Source:  fdic (2000).(cdic) gives member banks a risk score based on capital adequacy, and a number of
other quantifiable and qualitative factors. It then divides banks into four groups and
charges them premiums as shown in Table 7.
While relying on supervisory and capital adequacy, supplemented by other data, is
theoretically acceptable, estimations of economically fair premiums show that the
range of fair premiums is much wider than that currently charged by insurance agen-
cies. In Canada, the progression of insurance premium moves by a factor of two in
the ratios 1: 2: 4: 8.  While that for the u.s. is steeper, rising by a factor of 3:  1: 3: 9:
27, the progression is less than that suggested by research based on historical loss
rates for banks with different camelsratings. This research has shown that, if the best-
rated banks were to pay one basis point, the weakest should pay 81 basis points.87
Guarantors are reluctant to set such a steeply graded system because of the concern
that charging the weakest banks their actuarially fair rate would cause their failure.
Possibly this is a transitional, rather than a structural, problem so that an economi-
cally wide range would be introduced in a series of steps rather than instantaneously. 
A similar approach, based on capital adequacy and supervisory ratings, might seem
appropriate and feasible for the Netherlands, should it decide to impose assessments
that are adjusted for risk. Since 1999, in its supervisory review dnb uses a risk analy-
sis methodology, supported by in-house developed software Risk Analysis Support
Tool (rast)88 that in spirit is similar to the camel approach used in the us. Its main
objectives are to create insights into the inherent risks and the quality of controls of
credit institutions, and to structure and standardize the supervisory approach in
order to maximize the objectiveness of supervision. rastresults in scores that are not
available, for the time being not even to the individual bank concerned. The scores,
which do take the degree of capitalization of the individual banks into account, are
used as the basis for a customized supervisory program. The rast method, possibly
complemented with capital adequacy standards, might provide a practical, efficient
and effective method of risk-based deposit insurance pricing in the Netherlands. On
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Table 7 The cdic’s Premium Schedule
PremiumRate per 1% of
Premium Category Total Score Insured Deposits
1 >= 80 1/24th
2 >= 65 but < 80 1/12th
3 >= 50 but < 65 1/6th
4<   50 1/3rd
Source: fdic (2000) and cdic website [www.cdic.ca].the other hand, using rast for deposit insurance purposes would require that its
scores are publicly available, and this might be considered to be a drawback. 
As for the establishment of a target for the fund, a forward-looking approach, such
as that used by the u.k., would seem preferable for the Netherlands, which is in the
fortunate position that it has a history of a remarkably stable banking sector. There
is a potential problem, however, in publicly revealing funding needs over a short
horizon in that high estimates would foretell failures to come and might endanger
public confidence.89 Adopting a short horizon also incurs a problem of procyclicality.
Premiums would need to be high during recession times when banks’ earnings are
already under pressure. In addition, to use it, the protection fund (or funds, if the
investor protection and the deposit insurance scheme would be funded separately)
would need to research and choose suitable estimation techniques for management
expenses and compensation charges. 
In general, governments tend to favor the maintenance of a large fund, particularly
as it is often invested in domestic government securities. Bankers, on the other hand,
prefer to themselves employ the resources that would otherwise be transferred to the
fund. They consider that they can use these funds more profitably. The result of the
resulting political conflict has often been a compromiseæto place restrictions on the
size of the fund and set a target for it.  Premiums will be raised when the fund is
below target and lowered (and/or rebates will be made to members) when it the fund
is above target. Of course, adjusting premiums to maintain a rigid target will forego the
fund’s beneficial automatic-stabilizer properties.90 The average level of premiums will
reflect the current condition of the banking industry, and it will have pro-cyclical
properties. Then, premiums may vary substantially from year to year. Such variability
has been shown to increase banks’ cost of capital in a not insignificant manner.91
For these reasons, setting a target for the fund has been a political decision in most
countries. Perhaps this explains why there has, until recently, been little research on
how to scientifically set a target for the fund. Some newly established systems of
deposit protection in emerging market countries have set a target judged sufficient
to compensate depositors in, say, several small, or two medium-sized, banks. (No
country is known to have set a target high enough to compensate depositors in one
of its largest banks.) The United States based its target initially on historical experi-
ence of what had proved adequate in most years to meet the claims of the deposi-
tors in failed banks.92 Such an approach would not be useful in the Netherlands,
however, where there is little historical experience of failures. Of more possible rel-
evance to the Netherlands would be an assessment of needs based on the supervi-
sor’s risk profiles for each individual institution, for example by using the Nether-
lands’s system of supervisory risk assessment (rast). Alternatively, needs could be
estimated from each individual member’s credit risk profile as determined in its
internal models. 
60 Occasional Studies 2.2Recent advances in finance theory offer more scientifically formalized approaches to
setting a target for the fund. The authorities first choose an acceptable probability of
fund default over a specified time period and then estimate, using credit risk modeling
techniques, how much capital the fund would need to support this probability. Alter-
natively, the fund staff could apply contingent claims analysis to determine the mini-
mal optimum fund size as the present discounted value of the fund’s expected losses
in perpetuity.93 The different advanced approaches are assessed in Box 2. 
In a weak banking system, or one with a history of past banking crises, the size of the
fund estimated to be necessary to avoid insolvency might be viewed by the banking
community as unacceptably high. In this situation, a smaller fund might be main-
tained to be supplemented by additional assessments on members in the event of
unexpected losses. (The bifin the United States must be supplemented by additional
calls when required.) A graphic description of this view of the fund is shown in Fig-
ure 3 of Box 2, where the cumulative loss distribution would be divided into four
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Box 2  Advanced methods for setting a fund’s target
Credit Risk Modeling
In recent years commercial banks have developed credit risk models to determine
their economic capital.  A bank sees its assets portfolio as a collection of individ-
ual risk exposures that can be aggregated into a probability density function (pdf)
of cumulative losses in its portfolio. The aggregation makes allowance for volatil-
ity in, and the correlations among, the individual losses. The resulting distribu-
tions have been found to be highly non-normalæwith a high probability of small
losses and a low, but significant, probability of very large losses. Although based
on historical data, the approach can be seen as forward-looking in that it focuses
on volatilities, correlations, and future probabilities of default. In a similar fash-
ion, the insurer can view its exposure to the set of its members as a collection of
individual credit risks. Estimating these risks for individual members either from
historical or supervisory data, it can aggregate them into a distribution that can
be expected to approximate that in Figure 3. It can then set its fund size in rela-
tion to the resources necessary to compensate depositors.
A Pay-as-You-Go System without Reserves
The fund might be viewed as covering expected losses in the un-shaded region on
the left. Additional calls might be made on members to cover losses in the whole
of the shaded region A, while the government would again cover losses in region
B, assuming that it has been agreed politically that there should be zero proba-
bility of fund default. This interpretation would seem to characterize the system
set up in the United Kingdom at the end of 2001. The insurer (the Financial Ser-
vices Compensation Scheme or fscs) estimates each year how much its protec-
tion schemes will need to meet the claims likely to be placed upon them plus man-62 Occasional Studies 2.2
agerial expenses and levies (flat-rate) premiums to cover this estimate. If claims
turn out to be higher than anticipated, the fscs will levy additional charges ex
post. There is no provision for u.k. government aid; consequently, ex post calls
on members would need to cover regions aand bin Figure 3. Assuming that mem-
bers would be unable to fund all conceivable losses to the insurance systems, the
uk’s three protection funds must be seen as having some positive probability of
default. One might ask Moody’s or s&p to give the uk funds credit ratings, simi-
lar to the bond ratings that the rating agencies give to companies (and coun-
tries)æratings that are predicated on the debtor’s probability of default. A similar,
bottom-up, approach might also be useful in the Netherlands where annual needs
might be estimated from supervisory data on the riskiness of individual institu-
tions and the adequacy of their capital to cushion these risks. 
Economic Capital A protection system might prefer to hold capital above its imme-
diate known needs in order to protect itself against unforeseen events and
improve its (implicit) credit rating. The concept of economic capital is based on
a juxtaposition of a bank’s expected and unexpected losses. A bank’s loan loss
reserves are established to cover its anticipated losses in the portfolio, while its
capital is required to prevent unexpected losses from rendering it insolvent, except
in dire circumstances. The cut-off point in the loss distribution that determines
bank capital will carry with it an implied probability of failure, which can be trans-
lated into a credit rating, similar to that given by the credit-rating agencies. ‘The
economic capital for credit risk is determined in such a way that the estimated
probability of unexpected credit losses exhausting economic capital is less than the
bank’s ‘target insolvency rate.’ Capital allocation systems generally assume that it
is the role of reserving policies to cover expected credit losses, while it is the role of
equity capital to cover credit risk, or the uncertainty of credit losses. Thus required
economic capital is the amount of equity over and above expected losses neces-
sary to achieve the target insolvency rate.’ 94
A Fund with Reserves against Expected Losses
The interpretation of Figure 3 will be different if the fund has adopted the prac-
tice of setting aside both reserves to cover expected losses and capital to cushion
it against unexpected losses. (The fdic maintains both loss reserves and econom-
ic capital.) If the fund does make provision for expected losses (in the unshaded
region), it may view the fund balance in region a (over and above its reserves) as
its economic capital against unanticipated losses. It would then set the size of the
fund to give it an acceptably low probability of becoming insolvent. This level
might well be determined politically, especially if the government will be on tap
to cover the fund’s catastrophic losses in region b. Where there is no provision
for government support, the fund would likely retain a possibility of becoming
insolvent. The total amount of funds for reimbursing insured customers that
member institutions could afford to pay would determine the probability of sys-regions. In the un-shaded region, reserves make provision for expected losses. In the
left-lying portion of region A, the fund’s economic capital over and above its reserves
covers some portion of unanticipated losses. In the right-hand portion of region a,
ex post calls could be are made on banks to pay for those unexpected losses that are
not already covered by the fund. In region b, which lies beyond the sum of the fund
and additional calls on member banks, the government covers catastrophic fund
losses in order to avoid, or contain, a systemic crisis.
At least two Asian countries are currently considering using credit risk modeling
techniques to determine their funding needs in soon-to-be established systems of
deposit protection. As neither has much historical data on past failures, simulation
or ‘Monte Carlo’ techniques are being used to simulate the fund’s potential losses.
A similar approach might be used in the Netherlands, as a crosscheck on the ade-
quacy of assessments based on rast and capital adequacy.
The Pros and Cons of the Different Methods of Targeting
In the United States, the fdic has a long history and plenty of data on bank failures.
It can therefore select from the full range of methods for setting fund targets and use
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tem insolvency. A rating agency (such as Standard and Poor’s) would give a strong
insurer with a very low (0.01%) one-year probability of default a aaa rating, and a
weaker insurer with a 0.18% default probability a bbb rating.95 An additional
approach would be to have a system that sets yearly premiums so as to cover expect-
ed future losses plus administrative costs minus the return on the existing fund.  
Fig 3  Setting bif Insurance Reserves
A B
Average
Probability A = Banking System Responsibility




Source: Adapted from fdic (2000, p. 27)different approaches to complement one another using historical data, for example,
to provide a ‘reality check’ on sophisticated modeling. Deposit insurers, like the cgs
in the Netherlands, with a shorter history and fortunate paucity of failures, will not
find useful methods that rely on historical data. They might be attracted to the
approach that sets a target big enough to compensate depositors in small or medi-
um sized banks or uses credit-risk modeling methods. When using modeling tech-
niques, they would need to rely on Monte Carlo techniques that simulate failure
rates around supervisory data on the condition of individual banks.
5.2.4  The Deposit Base
The third decision in funding concerns the deposit base. When making assessments,
the guarantor can place charges on one of a number of bases. Although most coun-
tries use some measure of deposits, this still leaves a number of alternatives. Premi-
ums could be assessed (1) on ‘total deposits’ in the system, (2) on the sum of deposits
held in those accounts that are eligible for insurance or ‘eligible deposits,’ or (3) on
the amount of deposits that are both eligible and within the coverage limits or
‘insured deposits.’ It is important to keep these concepts separate; however, it is not
clear that all countries appreciate the distinction. They certainly do not use the ter-
minology consistently.
In the Netherlands the total of eligible deposits is unknown. It would consist of total
deposits less those for large enterprises and classes of deposits excluded from cover-
age including the deposits of credit and financial institutions, insurance companies
and pension funds, insider deposits, money laundered funds, government deposits,
and the deposits of those receiving high rates or financial concessions that have con-
tributed to the bank’s demise. A fortiori, the amount of insured deposits (eligible
deposits lying below the coverage limit) is unknown. 
Both fairness and finance theory would suggest that the premium (whether risk-
adjusted or not) should be applied to the amount of a bank’s deposits that are actu-
ally insured. Few countries attempt to do this, however, because banks’ computer
systems in many countries are not up to this task. The United States, for example,
currently estimates, rather than measures, the amount of insured deposits, because
the authorities have been reluctant to impose the costs of making more accurate cal-
culations on member institutions.96 As a compromise, a number of countries charge
premiums on the aggregate value of those classes of deposits that are eligible for insur-
ance, without attempting to calculate the amounts that lie below the coverage limit. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the reluctance to impose additional data-collection costs
on member institutions, ideally an insurance system needs a reliable estimate of its
exposure.  Accurate estimates of the value of each bank’s insured accounts (and the
64 Occasional Studies 2.2fund’s total exposure) are possible with today’s high-powered computers. More
importantly, the banks may not have kept an administration of the necessary data
in the first place. Collecting and administering these data might be an expensive
proposition for banks in European countries that exclude large classes of deposits
from coverage.97 For the Netherlands, the costs of requiring these data need to be
carefully weighed against the advantages of already having data on hand when a bank
fails. The high degree of concentration may be helpful in keeping these costs rela-
tively low. Apart from the need for accurate data on the fund’s exposure in order to
set premiums, relying on bank data, rather than on a requirement that a depositor
file a claim and have it verified, could vastly speed the process of paying compensa-
tion in the Netherlands. Even if it is decided not to require data on covered deposits
on an ongoing basis, it would be useful for member banks to conduct a survey that
estimates their coverage exposure at a certain point in time.
5.3  Fund Ownership, Governance and Accountability
5.3.1  Fund ownership
There are different approaches to the ownership of a deposit insurance fund. The
system may be owned and run by the government, by a private group, or it can be
jointly owned and run. Obviously, decisions about ex ante or ex post funding can-
not be taken without considering the issues of ownership, governance and account-
ability. A government-owned body may be a part of the government or the central
bank, or it may be an independent government corporation. A private body is usu-
ally incorporated under private law and may have shareholders and a private board
representing its members. But many deposit insurance systems have composite orga-
nizational structures that comprise both public and private elements. It will be
important for the Netherlands to carefully consider the ownership structure for its
system(s) of depositor and investor protection, because it can have important impli-
cations for its (their) funding. In fact, no government-owned or shared system
(except the Netherlands) is exclusively funded ex post.
In some countries, members are seen as paying a fixed fee (a ‘user fee’) to the gov-
ernment for its provision of deposit insurance services. The government owns the
contributions that member institutions make, and will most probably supplement
them with taxpayer funds if member contributions prove to be inadequate. In short,
the government is in charge of running the system. Such systems are typically fund-
ed ex ante with members’ contributions being stored in a fund until used to pay com-
pensation to depositors of failed banks. The systems in Canada, the Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary appear to fall into the category of user fee models.  So too does that
in the United Kingdom, except that its revised systems of protection have no pro-
vision for government financial aid. User fees may be flat rate or risk-adjusted.
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owned by member institutions. If there is a government role, it is limited to collect-
ing and dispensing the funds received. There will usually be no explicit provision for
state assistance to these systems, which will typically be funded ex post. As shown
in Table 4, the privately run systems in Austria, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg are
privately owned and operated, are funded ex post, and have no provision for state
aid to the deposit insurance system.98 The systems in France, Iceland and Italy, and
the privately run system in Germany are privately owned and operated, have no
explicit provision for state aid, but they do maintain a deposit insurance fund.
In many instances, it is not made explicit whether the government owns the funds
contributed in a funded system, or whether member institutions retain a claim on
them. This is the situation in the United States, where the fdic and many experts
consider that the u.s. has a mixed system with mostly public, but some private own-
ership, best described as a ‘mutual model.’99 The deposit insurance system in the
Netherlands is unusual in that it is run by the central bank, but is funded ex post,
the official role is limited, and statute requires dnb to consult (including with regard
to funding) with the appropriate trade associations. Consequently, the system might
also be characterized as mutually owned, but government-run.  
The authors’ attempts in Table 8 at classifying systems in eea countries, Canada and
the United States by ownership, funding, and risk adjustment show that countries
today typically maintain a fund. Of the 21 countries described in Table 8, 17 are fund-
ed, with 5 having a fund that can be topped up by ex post assessments (a mixed sys-
tem). Only four are funded solely ex post. The Netherlands falls into this category.
Systems, irrespective of whether they are financed ex ante or ex post, are almost
equally divided with respect to ownership. Seven are government-owned and eight
are privately owned. Ownership is shared in five countries. Nine countries (repre-
sented in bold type) risk-adjust they premiums they charge. All risk-adjusted schemes
in the table (and all but one around the world) maintain a fund to cover the bulk of
depositors’ claims.
5.3.2  Governance and Accountability
Combining the central bank, the supervisor, lender of last resort, and the guarantor
in one body is known to have disadvantages, causing potential conflicts of interest.100
This has prompted a number of countries to separate the responsibilities.101 The con-
flicts between the deposit insurer and the monetary authority are no longer an issue
in the Netherlands since it has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the
ecb.102 However, dnb remains the authority that provides liquidity support. There
can be differences in objectives between these three roles. dnb as the deposit insur-
er might wish a bank to be closed more rapidly than dnb as the supervisor because
66 Occasional Studies 2.2international experience has taught that a bank closed sooner is less costly to its
insurer than one closed later. On the other hand, closure of a bank usually backfires
on the reputation of the supervisor. Therefore, the supervisor may want to give the
bank as many opportunities as possible to recover. In addition, the lender of last
resort, because it is protected from loss by high quality collateral, may lend to an
insolvent institution and, by delaying closure, add to the deposit insurer’s losses.103
Given the highly concentrated nature of the banking system in the Netherlands,
failure of a large bank would inevitably harm the system as a whole. Supervisory
efforts are therefore focused on keeping banks sound and correcting any errors they
make in order to avoid their failure. The supervisory system has been successful in
this respect to date. No bank has failed since 1991. In this situation, it would seem to
make little administrative sense to establish a separate, independent body, such as
that in the u.k, to run the protection schemes. In fact, the Netherlands has taken the
major decision that dnb has responsibility for running the financial protection
schemes. However, legislation should be explicit about responsibilities. 
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Table 8.  Ownership and Funding in Systems of Deposit Insurance
in the eea, Canada, and the United States
Ownership/Operation Funding
Ex Post Ex ante Mixed





Private Austria France Denmark
Liechtenstein Germany (private) Italy
Luxembourg Iceland
Finland
Shared Netherlands Belgium u.s.
Norway
Spain
Sources:  Maxwell Stamp (2001) and Garcia (2002).
Note:  Countries in bold face risk-adjust their deposit insurance premiums. Some countries with private systems do
have government backing.The fact that the lender of last resort is typically protected from loss by taking high-
quality collateral raises the question why the deposit insurer is not similarly pro-
tected from loss. In fact, this idea is the genesis of the narrow bank proposal.  Only
the deposits only of banks, whose assets were confined to high quality, short-term
government securities, would be insured. The idea is intellectually appealing, but
runs counter to the flexibility of that is the hallmark of existing banks and the com-
prehensiveness of universal banking. To the authors’ knowledge, no country requires
collateral for deposit insurance.
68 Occasional Studies 2.2
Box 3  Should There Be Protection for Insurance Policyholders and
Pensioners?
104
There is, as yet, no general eu directive requiring protection for policyholders in
the insurance industry.  However, the decline in equity values worldwide has
already reduced the value of insurance companies’ (particularly life insurance
companies’) asset portfolios.  This phenomenon may continue and may cause sol-
vency problems at weaker institutions. Such a development might well prompt a
third eu Directive to protect insurance policy holders. Even without a directive,
funds to protect insurance policy holders have been established in at least 21 oecd
countries. Such funds are of two types. The first protects policyholders (typically
in full) in one or a few branches of the insurance industry, especially where insur-
ance is compulsory.105 The second type partially covers most contracts written by
participating insurance companies. When considering whether and how to pro-
tect insurance policyholders, the Netherlands would need to decide whether to
(1) cover just mandatory insurance or to include life and property/casualty poli-
cies,106 (2) confine coverage to natural persons, foundations, associations and
small businesses, (3) apply coinsurance and or a cap to coverage, (4) fund the
scheme ex ante or ex post, and (5) risk adjust premiums.107
In a similar fashion, stock-market declines around the world have led to reduced
values of the portfolios backing pension funds. Consequently, a number of pen-
sion schemes offered by private companies are currently seriously under-funded.
There is no eu Directive requiring protection for pensioners and the Netherlands
does not offer it. There may be a movement to extend protections to insurance
policyholders and pensioners within the eu community. The Netherlands may
want to consider the possibility of such an extension when it redesigns its systems
of protection for depositors and investors.1085.4  Relations with the public
5.4.1  Compensation Procedures and the Speed of Payment
Compensation that is delayed for three months or longer, as permitted in the eu
Directives, can have serious consequences or public confidence and for macroeco-
nomic policy. Chances are that depositors run from a bank in danger of failing if
access to their funds were denied for three months or more because that would be a
financial hardship as well as an inconvenience. One can, therefore, question the ben-
efit to public confidence of compensation so long delayed. Moreover, withdrawing
failed banks’ funds from circulation reduces the money supply until compensation
is paid. The macroeconomic consequences of such a reduction in the supply of mon-
ey would need to be considered by the ecb if many small banks, or one large one,
were to fail. The macroeconomic consequences would also include the potential for
a credit crunch deriving from capital-constrained banks.
Note the trade off between (1) relying on banking industry data as the basis for pay-
ing compensation rapidly and (2) requiring depositors to claim compensation slow-
ly. Using industry data will raise industry administrative costs but increase public
confidence in the banking industry and reduce the macroeconomic consequences
of bank failure. Using a simpler deposit base would ease the terms of this trade off.
While the Netherlands is required to make three eu exclusions, it could certainly
reduce the number of optional exclusions it makes and so move to a speedier pay-
out process. Moreover, fear of illiquidity might be a strong motivation to run for
those depositors that have both their loan (a mortgage for example) and their deposit
at the same bank. Some analysts point out that offsetting loans that are current and
loans that are in arrear could threaten the viability of sound borrowers who are
unable to refinance their loans elsewhere. When considering making changes in the
system, the Netherlands may wish to take this into account. The offsetting of loans
is common practice around the world, however. 
5.4.2  Public relations
dnb recognizes that there is a need for more information to be available to the pub-
lic regarding the operation of depositor and investor protection in the Netherlands.
It is currently planning a public education campaign. There are already a brochure,
mail and e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers available to beneficiaries of the
cgsand similar resources are made available for investors interested in the ics. More-
over, dnb has started participation in regular surveys among the general public to
assess the general knowledge of dnband its tasks. As it turns out, only a small minor-
ity of depositors is aware of the existence of deposit insurance. These results might
be used for public relations purposes regarding the protection schemes.
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tions in designing the future of the systems of protection in the Netherlands. After
the needed decisions on the future configuration of the protection scheme(s) have
been made, there are a number of options for conveying the decisions and their
implications to the public. There can be public meetings for educational purposes
in different parts of the country. A web site can be developed to inform citizens and
help them calculate their entitlements. A telephone answering service for questions
about supervision is already available to the public. This is a passive, demand-based
form of information dissemination. In fact, in a system with flat-rates, actively
informing the public has as a drawback that it in fact encourages depositors to entrust
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Box 4  Integrating the Schemes for Financial Protection
In addition to the improvements that the Netherlands may consider to make in
order to move further towards best practices, it may also want to consider inte-
grating its protection schemes. This has implications for governance, but may also
influence decisions regarding funding, for example for the optimal fund size.
Since September 2002, De Nederlandsche Bank has maintained responsibility for
running the protection scheme for investors in securities firms (the ics) as well as
the scheme for banks’ depositors and investors (the cgs). The cgs already covers
both depositors and investors, so a question naturally arises whether the ics
should be integrated into the cgs. Doing so would be expected to result in admin-
istrative economies. A problem with integration arises in that it would be the dif-
ficulty of fairly and efficiently apportion funding costs across a number of finan-
cial firms with different portfolios that place different default risks on the fund. 
The U.K. Response
The authorities in the United Kingdom addressed the funding problem by seek-
ing administrative efficiency by combining its new protection schemes under one
administrative body (the fscs). At the same time, the authorities recognized that
it would be difficult to convince member institutions of the fairness of combin-
ing funding for the three diverse schemes. Consequently, the fscsmaintains three
separate funds. Nevertheless, the different industry segments in the u.k. experi-
enced failures and demands on their resources at different times and in different
amounts. Thus, combining the three funds would have created one diversified
fund as compared to three less diversified funds. And finance theory, in general,
favors diversification, in the face of a correlation below unity.
Consequently, in making this decision in the Netherlands, dnb needs to weigh
the potential efficiencies from diversifying a combined fund across different com-
ponents of the financial services industry against the difficulty of setting premi-
ums equitably. Research can indicate whether demands on the four industry com-
ponents negatively correlated and whether diversification could offer financial
benefits.their money to high-risk banks that promise high interest rates, as the deposits are
insured anyway. Introduction of risk-based premiums facilitates public relations for
the deposit insurer, because the risky banks and their depositors will need to pay
more for the insurance.
5.5  A summary of possible changes
The purpose of this study is not to make explicit recommendations but rather to sug-
gest areas for public discussion of possible changes to the systems of depositor and
investor protection in the Netherlands. It submits that discussion could profitably
address the issues of switching from an ex post to a partially funded system in order
to facilitate risk-based pricing, making explicit the basis for insurance charges on
banks, reconsidering procedures for offsetting loans against deposits, changing pre-
sent arrangements for the governance and accountability of the cgs and ics. con-
tinuing and extending dnb’s publicity campaign, and considering introducing guar-
antees for insurance products and pensions. 
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Marked changes in the financial markets and the supervisory landscape, together
with the eu’s 1994 Directive on deposit guarantees and its 1997 Directive on investor
compensation are causing European governments to reconfigure their systems of
protection for depositors and investors.
To be effective, regulatory organisations and supervisory practices need to keep
abreast of changes in the composition of the financial markets. In many countries,
including the Netherlands, this need has already led to a reorganisation of regulato-
ry/supervisory activities. With the rise of conglomerates, there has been movement
away from the old, institutional approach to regulation that oversaw all of the activ-
ities undertaken by a given class of institutions. Under institutional regulation, banks
were regulated and supervised separately from insurance companies and securities
firms. The first supervisory movement was tentativeætowards functional regulation,
where a given type of activity would be regulated and supervised equally by a single
regulator regardless of which type of financial firm was conducting it. Here, the
banking regulator would oversee banking activities wherever they were conducted,
and the securities’ regulator would oversee securities activities across all kinds of
financial firms. Both institutional and functional regulation encountered problems
in a European world dominated by financial conglomerates. Moreover, the eu’s ear-
ly focus was on banking and securities activities, to the neglect of insurance.
The obsolescence of segmented regulation and problems with functional regulation,
led to a further supervisory development at the end of the 1990s. Regulation began
to be organised according to its objective. One regulatory objective was to preserve
the stability of the financial system. A second objective was to require individual
financial firms to attain certain prescribed standards in order to protect their safety
and soundness and to correct non-compliance with these standards. The third objec-
tive was to make sure that financial firms conducted their business operations in an
ethical manner ‘to ensure that the consumer received a fair and honest service.’109
Regulation by objective would also encompass the financial system in its wider con-
text of including insurance companies in addition to banking and securities firms.
The changes in the configuration of the financial markets and in the location of their
supervisors necessarily had repercussions on the design and location of systems of
protection for depositors, investors, and policyholders. The response of some Euro-
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Directives on deposit-guarantee schemes and investor-protection schemes has been
described above. 
The Netherlands, too, is using the current changes in its institutional design of finan-
cial supervision as an opportunity to consider revising the systems of protection. A
number of issues are at stake and have been discussed in this paper, which has pre-
sented arguments for and against ex ante funding and risk-adjusted premiums.
Although some analysts see the arguments as finely balanced, this paper recom-
mends that both ex ante funding and risk-based premiums are worthy of close con-
sideration for change.  If the reorganized system(s) are to be funded ex ante, at least
partially, this would facilitate risk-adjusting premiums, reduce member institutions’
uncertainty regarding funding arrangements, and ensure that failing institutions con-
tribute to meeting the cost of deposit protection. The fund could be financed min-
imally to cover just anticipated needs and administrative expenses for the current
year, or it could be made larger by including capital to cover unexpected losses.
Appropriately set risk-based charges could provide proper incentives, although set-
ting appropriate charges is acknowledged to be difficult. A funded system with risk-
based premiums would require data on the total value of either eligible or insured
deposits (and investments) on a regular basis. Such data would be necessary because
a guarantee system needs to know its obligations in order to set premiums and a tar-
get for the fund. In addition, the paper recommends consideration of changing cur-
rent practices with regard to offsetting loans in order protect small-business bor-
rowers, who are also depositors, from having to go out of business as a result of losing
their and household mortgage borrowers to keep their homes. The paper also makes
a case for ending the current ambiguity regarding the basis for ex past charges. Sur-
viving banks need to know what they are expected to pay.
In context of the European Union, deposit and investor protection is more a mat-
ter of consumer protection than financial stability. This approach is partly a reflec-
tion of the composition of the European financial system. Given the concentrated
nature of the European banking and insurance systems, there is a reluctance to allow
financial firms, particularly large firms, to fail. Where financial firms fail infre-
quently, there will be less of a need to design customer protection systems to be a
tool of financial safety and soundness. Other tools will be employed to promote this
goal. European emphasis on consumer protection is also a reflection of theeuDirec-
tives’ focus on the creation of harmonised financial markets. In Europe, instead of
designing protection systems to avoid moral hazard, this pitfall is countered and
financial stability is ensured more by other means. Capital-adequacy and other reg-
ulatory requirements are emphasised, as is their strict enforcement by strong finan-
cial supervisors, and in Germany at least, by monitoring by peer institutions. In this
context, financial safety nets should be effective in protecting consumers, while at
the same time providing proper incentives to the financial institutions concerned.
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objective under  ‘Twin Peaks’ consisting of a
Financial Stability Commission to ensure
adequate prudential supervision and maintain a
sound financial system and a Consumer
Protection Commission to enforce conduct-of-
business regulation.
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